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American copyright law has undergone an unappreciated conceptual 
transformation over the course of the last century. Originally conceived of 
as a form of private law—focusing on horizontal rights, privileges, and 
private liability—copyright law is today understood principally through its 
public-regarding goals and institutional apparatus, in effect as a form of 
public law. This transformation	is the result of changes in the ideas of law 
and lawmaking that occurred in American legal thinking following World 
War II, manifested in the deeply influential philosophy of the Legal Process 
School of jurisprudence which shaped the modern American copyright 
landscape. In the Legal Process conception, determining the substantive 
content of the law is fundamentally a matter of identifying the institution 
with formal competence (and legitimacy) to decide the matter, and then 
deciphering its policies and directives for an area of law in a purposive 
manner.	The heyday of the Legal Process School, the 1950s and 1960s, 
coincided with the period during which the current U.S. copyright regime 
was being constructed. Several of its core lessons find direct veneration 
therein, including: the centrality of legislation as the harbinger of copyright’s 
policy and purposes; the primacy of collectivist copyright policy over 
individual copyright principles; a recognition of the limitations of courts and 
judge-made law; and the treatment of copyright as a specialized but 
autonomous body of law requiring expert administration. As this Article 
argues, the U.S. copyright regime is today better conceived of as a “legal 
process,” wherein the law is dynamic, purposive, and multi-institutional in 
origin. Modern copyright thinking would do well to embrace this reality and 
develop mechanisms to deal with this fundamental—yet unacknowledged—
transformation, which explains a variety of perceived anomalies and 
puzzles within the working of the system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Modern American copyright law is not what it was less than a century ago. 
Not only is the substantive content of current copyright law characterized by 
an overbearing complexity, but the proliferation of institutional and private 
actors within the system has fundamentally transformed its own 
understanding of law and lawmaking, and thereby the very goals of copyright 
law. Copyright’s formal blackletter directives undoubtedly originate in the 
text of the Copyright Act of 1976,1 the most detailed copyright statute ever 
enacted in the United States.2 Nevertheless, the statute is in many important 
respects underinclusive and incomplete. This reality has required federal 
courts to develop rules and principles for different copyright questions, 
sometimes working within the interstices of the statute’s directives and 
 
1 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–805 (2018)). 
2 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT xiii-xiv (1978) (lamenting the 
complexity of the new Act and noting that its “body of detailed rules [is] reminiscent of the Internal 
Revenue Code”); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. 
REV. 857, 859 (1987) (describing it as a “detailed comprehensive code, chock-full of specific, heavily 
negotiated compromises”); Barbara Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L.S. 
L. REV. 477, 479 (1977) (describing the novelty of the new Act). 
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congressional intent,3 and at other times out of whole cloth, guided by their 
own sense of the system’s values.4  
Adding to this legislative–judicial dynamic is the role that the Copyright 
Office plays in developing copyright rules. As the agency with expertise in 
the area, the Office regularly intervenes in copyright disputes, advises 
Congress and other agencies on copyright matters, offers its own 
interpretation of statutory and judge-made law, and engages in notice-and-
comment rulemaking in different specialized domains.5 And then there is 
private ordering. Customs, norms, and industry-wide collective practices 
continue to flourish and grow in a wide range of domains and thereby 
introduce additional constraints on the behavior of actors.6 Some of these 
norms and practices find their way into the formal content of copyright’s rules 
through judicial opinions, but most thrive independently.7 
Determining what U.S. copyright law actually says about an issue is 
therefore an indelibly complex exercise. It involves navigating the roles of the 
system’s various institutional actors, unraveling their goals for the system and 
their potential for realization, and then understanding how their respective 
directives interact and coalesce to collectively constitute “copyright law.” Yet, 
this complexity is hardly just an incidental byproduct of the system. As this 
Article argues, it is instead the result of a particular and unique conception of 
copyright law that has come to dominate modern American copyright 
 
3 See, e.g., ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 440-50 (2014) (relying on legislative history 
and the text of the statute to understand the definition of a “public performance”); Feist Publ’ns v. 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 354-61 (1991) (same with the originality doctrine); Pivot 
Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 920-21 (7th Cir. 2004) (same with conceptual 
separability for useful articles); Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (same 
with the joint works doctrine); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 505-07 (2d Cir. 1991) (same).  
4 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005) 
(developing a standard of liability for inducement of infringement); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (developing a “transformative use” defense within the fair use 
context); Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-12 (2d Cir. 1992) (developing 
a test for assessing the infringement of computer software).  
5 See 17 U.S.C. § 701(a)–(b) (2018) (detailing the “functions and duties” of the Register of 
Copyright, the “director of the Copyright Office”); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 101.3 (3d ed. 2017) (describing the 
functions of the Copyright Office) [hereinafter U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM]. 
6 See generally Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (describing the emergence of collective 
licensing within certain copyright industries); Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom 
in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899 (2007) (discussing the use of custom in copyright—and 
intellectual property law—more generally). 
7 One such example of custom making its way into copyright doctrine is in the fair use doctrine. 
See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 n.7, 593 (1985) (considering 
“standard journalistic practice” in determining whether news organization’s taking was fair use); 
Ringgold v. Black Entm’t. Television, 126 F.3d 70, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting fair use defense 
for failure to follow industry custom and pricing in licensing set decorations). 
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thinking ever since the second half of the twentieth century. Built around the 
ideas of the Legal Process School of legal analysis that was deeply influential 
in the 1950s and 1960s,8 this approach to copyright law treats it principally as 
a form of public law, wherein the advancement of the overall public welfare 
takes normative precedence over—and thereby motivates—the promotion of 
private interests, i.e., the interests of the author and of the user. Public 
welfare is in turn understood as a multifaceted goal, constructed and realized 
through the involvement of numerous public institutions that bring different 
collectivist values to the table, while imposing crucial checks on each other’s 
power and legitimacy.  
The modern legal process conception of copyright law is in stark contrast 
to the approach that preceded it, which viewed the subject as one of private 
law. Areas of private law—such as tort law, contract law, and property law—
are characterized by their primary emphasis on the private parties involved 
in a legal dispute, and their individual interests at stake.9 To the extent that 
they care about broader social goals and policies, they do so only ever through 
the lens of the private dispute at hand.10 Within copyright law, this meant a 
focus on the author’s rights and the defendant-user’s privileges and 
immunities, with the broader public welfare a welcome byproduct of those 
entitlements that was nonetheless secondary in importance.  
Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century copyright case law and 
commentary epitomized this private law understanding. In a little known essay 
published at the turn of the century, Christopher Columbus Langdell 
characterized copyright law as the public’s (i.e., the “State[’s]”) intervention on 
behalf of a private purpose, through its grant to authors of a “power to enforce” 
a prohibition against unauthorized copying.11 Courts in this era echoed these 
ideas, implicitly acknowledging that copyright was about balancing exclusivity 
 
8 The seminal text of the school is The Legal Process. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, 
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW 
(William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).  For a historical overview of the school and 
its texts, see William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The 
Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, supra, at li-cxxxvi [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction]. 
9 See John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 
1640 (2012) (explaining how private law “defines the rights and duties of individuals and private 
entities as they relate to one another”); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1719 (1976) (”Private legal justice supposedly consists in the 
respect for rights.”); Roscoe Pound, Public Law and Private Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 469, 471-74 
(1939) (characterizing private law as law that “treat[s] all individuals as equal” and focuses on 
restoring the individual to their position from before the legal wrong). 
10 For a fuller discussion of this idea, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Private Law and Public Right, 61 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 191, 192 (2011) (noting how, from a private law perspective, “arguments that seek to 
have the law achieve goals external to the parties’ relationship	.	.	.	are all structurally inconsistent 
with fair and coherent determinations of liability”). 
11 Christopher Columbus Langdell, Patent Rights and Copy Rights, 12 HARV. L. REV. 553, 555 (1899). 
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and use, as between plaintiff and defendant.12 Copyright law was thus, first and 
foremost, a body of private law regulating a horizontal relationship. By the 
middle of the twentieth century, this would change dramatically. One mid-
twentieth century Supreme Court opinion captured the shift most dramatically 
when it unequivocally concluded that in copyright law the author’s benefit was 
little more than a “secondary consideration,” less important than copyright’s 
“public purpose.”13 The private interests at issue were, in other words, merely 
in service of a public purpose, copyright’s “ultimate aim.”14 
The roots of this fundamental transformation are to be found in 
important developments in American legal thinking that took place after 
World War II. While the Legal Realists of the 1930s and 1940s had succeeded 
in debunking the claim that legal reasoning was an autonomous enterprise 
wholly immune from politics,15 they had at the same time failed to propose a 
constructive alternative in its place. The identification of law as rampantly 
indeterminate and driven by purely instrumental considerations seemed 
grossly unsatisfying to many, especially in light of the events of the war.16 It 
is in this climate that the Legal Process School emerged, principally in the 
work of Lon Fuller, Henry Hart, and Albert Sacks, all professors at the 
Harvard Law School.17 While acknowledging the instrumental nature of law, 
 
12 See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249-52 (1903) (discussing 
copyright in commercial advertisement pictorial illustrations); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884) (developing the idea that the author of the photograph was the person 
who was the “effective cause” for its existence); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1880) (developing 
and refining the exclusion of ideas and methods from copyright protection as a limit on the scope 
of the plaintiff ’s right). 
13 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). 
14 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (noting how the 
“ultimate aim” of copyright was to “stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good”). 
15 See Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at lxvi-lxviii. For Legal Realist efforts to 
expose the myth of autonomous legal reasoning, see generally JEROME S. FRANK, LAW AND THE 
MODERN MIND (1930); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934); 
Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930). 
16 See Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at lxvi (noting that “positivism’s separation 
of law and morals” was heavily disfavored leading up to World War II); see also ROSCOE POUND, 
CONTEMPORARY JURISTIC THEORY 10 (1940) (writing on the eve of World War II that “[o]ur faith 
in” an objective judiciary “is futile”). 
17 See generally LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); HART & SACKS, supra note 8, 
at 1-181; Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). Of these, 
The Legal Process is widely considered to be the classical work of the school. In addition to The Legal 
Process, the other classic of this school was the work on federal courts by Henry Hart and Herbert 
Wechsler. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953). The literature on the Legal Process School is quite voluminous. For a 
small sample, see Charles L. Barzun, The Forgotten Foundations of Hart and Sacks, 99 VA. L. REV. 1 
(2013); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 107 HARV. 
L. REV. 2031 (1994) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Making]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on 
the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953 (1994).  
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the Legal Process School argued that the content of the law was to be 
determined by the appropriate allocation of decisionmaking authority among 
different institutions, a principle it described as “institutional settlement.”18  
Institutional settlement allowed the law to move seamlessly between the is 
and the ought on different substantive questions, enabling it to grow organically, 
while maintaining its rational edifice.19 Whether something was settled law was 
seen as a question of who (i.e., which institution) had the authority to determine 
it, in turn a product of whether that institution ought to be considered the right 
one for the particular substantive question at issue. Institutional settlement 
embodied a dynamic conception of law that consciously merged means and ends, 
premised on the idea that law is a continuous “doing of something.”20 Such 
allocation would facilitate each institution (within a legal area) to develop the 
law in accordance with its own core competence, thereby enabling the law as a 
whole to further its avowed goals, in turn identified based on such 
competence.21 Institutional settlement therefore directly addressed the 
indeterminacy of legal rules through a principled allocation of lawmaking 
authority, which at once acknowledged the role of discretion while also 
evidencing a strong commitment to the rule of law.  
The Legal Process principle of “institutional settlement” had an 
important prescriptive component to it. And this was the recognition that 
while courts were principled decision-makers in the adjudicative setting, they 
nonetheless had obvious limitations in their problem-solving and lawmaking 
capacities.22 Congress was instead the “principal agent of change and policy 
development” which it realized through statutes.23 Courts were to operate 
within the interstices of congressional enactments and defer to other 
institutions in a given area whenever needed. Law was therefore recognized 
to be a “purposive” enterprise, with every legal doctrine embodying an 
 
18 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 5. 
19 LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 5-8 (1978); HART & SACKS, supra note 8, 
at 4-6. In Fuller’s vision, which Hart and Sacks adopted, the merger of “is” and “ought” entailed 
embracing the connection between law and morality, or the recognition that identifying what the 
law is on a question always entails engaging the question of what it ought to be. Or, as Fuller himself 
put it, the law embodied in a “statute or decision is not a segment of being, but .	.	. a process of 
becoming.” FULLER, supra, at 10. 
20 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 148. 
21 Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at xciii. 
22 See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 923 
(2003) (noting that an awareness of these limitations was the “first step” of the paradigm); Eskridge 
& Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at lxxxiii (“[L]aw is not juricentric, and courts are part of a 
larger institutional system . . . .”); Fallon, supra note 17, at 966 (noting how the theory limited the 
judicial role to elaborating principles and policies “traceable to more democratically legitimate 
decisionmakers”); Fuller, supra note 17, at 393-404 (explaining the limits of adjudication as a method 
of lawmaking from within Legal Process).  
23 Fallon, supra note 17, at 957-58. 
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objective, and courts tasked with ascertaining that purpose and elaborating 
on it.24 Implicit in this formulation of law as a purposive enterprise was the 
belief that when it came to statutory regimes—areas of law created by 
Congress through legislation—the purpose of the law was to be found in the 
statute.25 The soundest “starting point” in identifying the policy of a legal 
area was therefore the statute, which courts had to accept, elaborate on, or 
supplement as needed in a purposive manner.26  
Institutional settlement as such was, of course, far from suggesting a 
mechanistic role for courts. All the same, it marked a genuine departure from 
the prior Legal Realist accounts, which appeared perfectly fine with 
juricentric common law rule development wherein courts would bring their 
own views of policy and purpose to bear on legal doctrine. In the Legal 
Process School, courts were “valorize[ed]” for their strengths as principled 
decisionmakers,27 with the simultaneous recognition that in important 
respects those principles might be overridden by “policy preferences” better 
delineated by other institutions.28 Principled (or reasoned) argument had its 
limits and policymaking was therefore presumptively outside the natural 
forte identified for courts,29 and was instead within the domain of Congress.   
 
24 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 148. 
25 The clearest statement of this idea is found in the theory’s observation that a judge is always 
“obliged” to relate the decision to the statute out of which the question arises, rather than to “think 
of himself as in the same position as a legislator taking part in the enactment of the statute in the 
first place.” Id. at 143. This was central to the idea of “reasoned elaboration.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
26 Eskridge & Frickey, Making, supra note 17, at 2038. This idea does in reality predate Hart 
and Sacks and can be traced to earlier scholars who had grown skeptical of the role of courts after 
the successes of Legal Realism. Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at lviii-lxii. This view 
was most fervently held by Justice Felix Frankfurter, well known as a “patron saint” of the Legal 
Process School on the Court. Brad Snyder, The Former Clerks Who Nearly Killed Judicial Restraint, 89 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2129, 2133 (2014); see also Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at 
lxi. For Frankfurter’s insistence on restraint and deference to legislatures, see Felix Frankfurter, Some 
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 533-34 (1947). 
27 See ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 143-59 (1998) 
(describing this trend and its conformity with institutional settlement). 
28 Geoffrey C. Shaw, H.L.A. Hart’s Lost Essay: Discretion and the Legal Process School, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 666, 679 (2013); see also Edward L. Rubin, Legal Reasoning, Legal Process and the Judiciary as 
an Institution, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 265, 278-79 (1997) (book review) (identifying the idea that courts 
“should not make policy decisions” as a key facet of Legal Process); Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian 
Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 217 (1983) (noting how Legal 
Process “would counsel judges to leave all matters of substantive policy to the other more 
representative branches”).  
29 See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of 
Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (1996) (“The particular task of courts	.	.	. is to decide cases 
on the basis of reasoned argument, and only issues that can be resolved by that approach are 
appropriate for judicial resolution.”). 
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A natural corollary to institutional settlement in the Legal Process 
tradition was the theory’s faith in administrative agencies.30 Developed as it 
was following the New Deal, the theory took the complexity of legal regimes 
as an innate feature of the legal landscape, but was completely sanguine about 
such complexity by empowering specific expert agencies to deal with it. In 
particular, the theory augmented its account of judicial skepticism vis-à-vis 
the legislature with the idea of judicial deference to administrative expertise, 
well before this became an accepted interpretive method.31 This method was 
seen to enhance the overall “effectiveness” of a legal regime.32 
The heyday of the Legal Process School, the 1950s and 1960s, coincided 
with the call for a comprehensive revision of U.S. copyright law. In 1955, 
Congress authorized a series of studies to document the problems that needed 
to be addressed in a new statute.33 An overarching feature of these efforts was 
the idea that it was Congress—empowered by the Constitution—that assumed 
primary responsibility for delineating not just the content of copyright law, 
but also its policies and purposes. The revision sought to convert into 
legislation aspects of copyright doctrine that had been created by courts, and 
in so doing gave effect to the idea that copyright’s commitment to “public 
welfare” was something that Congress alone was best positioned to realize.34 
Principles of copyright doctrine that had been developed through judicial 
reasoning were now enshrined in a systematic exposition of the entire regime, 
in an effort to introduce a degree of uniformity and coherence into the law 
around an identified policy: promoting public welfare by inducing creativity.35 
The comprehensive revision unfolded over the next two decades, 
culminating in the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976. The new regime 
that eventually resulted had at the end venerated several key tenets of the Legal 
 
30 Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at cxxxi. 
31 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 1288-90. Indeed, the book’s first example is one where a 
federal court defers to administrative expertise in an area, despite being inclined to go in a different 
direction. Id. at 57-58; see also Dorf, supra note 22, at 923 n.184 (discussing this example). 
32 Id. at 151. 
33 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE 
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW ix (1961) [hereinafter REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS 1961 REPORT]. 
34 See id. at 5 (observing that the “primary purpose” of copyright legislation is “to foster the 
creation and dissemination of intellectual works for the public welfare”). The idea that Congress 
alone had power can be traced back to the deliberations accompanying the 1909 Act, which the Report 
quotes from with approval on the point that “Congress shall have the power to grant such rights if 
it thinks best.” Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
35 See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 40 (1967) (noting how the 
1909 Act “leaves the development of fundamentals to the judges”); NIMMER, supra note 2, at vi 
(describing how the 1976 Act consciously sought to depart from the judicial flexibility of the prior 
regimes); Litman, supra note 2, at 858-59 (discussing how some provisions of the 1976 Act 
“purport[ed] to adopt common law doctrine” while “others purport[ed] to abrogate it.”); see also 
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 129 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5745. 
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Process School. First, it firmly entrenched the idea that Congress had a 
dispositive say in the development of copyright policy (and when needed, 
principles), constrained only by the vague directives of the Constitution. While 
the idea had been latent in the buildup to the revision, the resulting regime 
made it explicit.36 Not only was Congress’s say on copyright policy to be 
definitive, but Congress was itself seen as the originator of such policy and free 
to disregard, override, or modify prior policy or copyright principles.37 Second, 
courts were to limit themselves to the “reasoned elaboration” of congressional 
policy, as contained in the statutory scheme.38 Even when the statute vested 
significant discretion in courts, they were to exercise this discretion in 
accordance with the broader goals emanating from the scheme, in a principled 
manner. No longer were courts seen as “partners” with Congress in this 
enterprise.39 Judicially crafted copyright principles had to give way to 
statutorily delineated policy, when an accommodation was impossible. Third, 
the regime began to value greater deference to the expert body, the Copyright 
Office, which had played a key role in the comprehensive revision. It became 
standard practice to solicit and look to the Office’s views on the statute and 
policy.40 What thus emerged was the idea of copyright law as a regime with 
parts that needed to be “administered” using specialized expertise.41  
Perhaps most importantly though, these structural shifts in the regime 
produced a more far-reaching—but largely unnoticed—change in the 
conception of law that copyright was. Given its emphasis on legislation, the 
Legal Process School had succeeded in characterizing questions of statutory 
interpretation and deference to expertise, regardless of the content of the 
underlying area, as a matter of public law. Indeed, Legal Process has been 
characterized as having set the “public law agenda” since its origins.42 In 
 
36 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 1961 REPORT, supra note 33, at 5 (quoting the legislative history 
of the prior Act). 
37 Litman, supra note 2, at 859 nn.16-17. 
38 The Register of Copyright at the time described this as a “shift in direction for the very 
philosophy of copyright itself.” Ringer, supra note 2, at 479; see also KAPLAN, supra note 35, at 41 
(noting the problem of “a crowding of suggestive case law” under the prior Act); Litman, supra note 
2, at 858 (noting the extensive role of courts under the prior Act and its reversal in the 1976 regime). 
39 See Pierre N. Leval, An Assembly of Idiots, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1049, 1062 (2002) (describing 
and lamenting this change). 
40 For the first attempt by the Supreme Court to do this, see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 211-
12 (1954). By 2014, this had become common practice, such that the Register noted that the 
“Copyright Office is aware that deference to its expert administrative authority turns upon	.	.	.	the 
correlation	.	.	.	[of its] practices to the state of the law.” Maria A. Pallante, The Next Generation 
Copyright Office: What it Means and Why it Matters, 61 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 213, 225 (2014). 
41 See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 568-69 (1973) (describing the Office as the 
“agency empowered to administer the copyright statutes”); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS: FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2012, at 3 
(2013) (describing how the Office “administered the copyright law”).   
42 Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at lii. 
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internalizing the structural lessons of the Legal Process School, copyright law 
readily signed onto this agenda. Since then, copyright law and jurisprudence 
have focused on the public administration of the statutory entitlement, one 
whose goals and ideals were set and constrained through institutional 
settlement. The regime’s focus shifted from the allocation of private rights 
(and duties) to the allocation of decisionmaking power. And with this shift, 
copyright law underwent a quiet metamorphosis into an area of public law. 
The effects of this transformation have been pervasive and continue to be 
felt in the copyright system to this day.43 By grafting public-focused, 
institutional, and administrative ideals onto copyright’s basic framework of 
right and liability, the new regime produced a veritable conflation of principle 
and policy. Individual copyright rules and doctrines reveal little alignment 
with the system’s overall avowed goal of incentivizing creativity.44 Courts—
including the Supreme Court—consider themselves powerless to second-
guess Congress’s construction of the system’s goals and policies, both generally 
and in individual cases.45 They instead make every effort to artificially align 
copyright’s well-worn rules and principles with the regime’s overall policy as 
manifested in the statute. Additionally, the system’s overall structural 
complexity is seen as an innate feature of the system, and copyright reform 
efforts seem perfectly willing to add to this complexity in multiple ways.46 
 
43 Scholars have previously predicted and documented these changes. See, e.g., Joseph Liu, 
Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 129-31 (2004); Peter Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s 
Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 194 (2002). Menell presciently predicted that “Congress 
will increasingly delegate authority to regulatory bodies and administrative 
officials	.	.	.	.	[C]opyright lawyers will need to learn a lot more about administrative law as this new 
era unfolds.” Menell, supra, at 197. Liu’s account focuses on the complexity of the 1976 Act—in 
contrast to prior regimes—to argue that modern copyright law has become “regulatory” in structure. 
Liu, supra, at 90. While descriptively accurate, it simplifies a variety of important conceptual 
distinctions in characterizing the modern system as “regulatory.” It also altogether disregards the 
possibility that the change in copyright law was produced by a broader transformation of the very 
concept of law in America that occurred at the time and focuses entirely on factors internal and 
unique to the copyright system. Liu, supra, at 129-31. 
44 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
1569, 1581-88 (2009) (documenting the mismatch between copyright’s avowed purposes and actual 
doctrine); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (1996) 
(describing the gulf between copyright justification and copyright doctrine). 
45 See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 324 (2012) (refusing to “second-guess the political choice 
Congress made” in enacting copyright legislation); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 188 (2003) 
(concluding that on the question of whether Congress “rational[ly] exercise[d]” its legislative power 
it would “defer[] substantially to Congress”).  
46 As examples, consider the Copyright Office’s report on a small claims court for copyright 
disputes and its study on music licensing. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT AND THE 
MUSIC MARKETPLACE 133 (2015) (providing analysis and recommendations); U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, COPYRIGHT SMALL CLAIMS 92 (2013) (providing key findings and recommendations). 
Both reports focus on legislative reform as their solutions to current problems. 
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American copyright law is today better understood as a “legal process” 
rather than just a body of legal rules, and this Article traces the intellectual 
history of this transformation. The concept of law underlying copyright bears 
the unmistakable imprint of the Legal Process School, wherein (a) the law is 
continually attempting to identify and realize an external purpose, and (b)	the 
public institutional dynamics of law production are just as important as the 
content of legal directives. Instead of fighting this reality, modern copyright 
thinking would do well to acknowledge it and move to understanding just how 
the legal-process features of the system might be better perfected and 
rationalized through the lessons of Legal Process theory. At a minimum, this 
will include: appreciating the working of the unstated “institutional 
settlement” ideal within the system; articulating a coherent account of what 
“reasoned elaboration” means for courts interpreting the copyright statute and 
deferring to expertise in that exercise; and embracing the complexity of the 
system by better managing it through the ideals of public administration. This, 
in turn, is likely to generate the important realization that modern copyright 
law is in a true sense a hybrid public–private system, wherein both public law 
and private law ideals attempt to coexist in equilibrium, albeit a dynamic one. 
The argument that follows proceeds in four Parts. Part I begins with a 
brief description of the modern “public law” model of copyright that is today 
seen in U.S. copyright law and jurisprudence. It shows how copyright is today 
conceptualized as a private right that exists principally/only to further a 
public purpose, characterized by a commitment to divided lawmaking and 
interlaced with regulatory goals. Part II sets out the classical private law 
conception of copyright law that existed through the middle of the twentieth 
century, beginning with the era of Legal Formalism (or “classical legal 
thought”47) and culminating in the heyday of Legal Realism. During this era, 
copyright law and jurisprudence focused on the horizontal structure of the 
copyright entitlement and emphasized the role of principle (over policy) in 
the functioning of the system, which in turn recognized a central place for 
judges in the overall skein. Part III then documents the Legal Process turn in 
copyright jurisprudence that emerged post-World War II. It first sets out the 
central tenets of the Legal Process School and shows how several of its core 
lessons came to be all too readily internalized by the emergent copyright 
regime of the period. Having established the existence of this turn, Part IV 
then moves to the prescriptive and briefly shows how modern copyright 
discourse might actively embrace this turn to rationalize its public law 
elements through Legal Process thinking. 
 
47 See DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 28 (2006) 
(using the term “classical legal thought” to refer to legal thinking that “emerged between 1850 and 
1885” and “flourished between 1885 and 1935” but declined thereafter). 
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I. AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW: PUBLIC LAW IN DISGUISE 
As a way of classifying various areas of law, the distinction between the 
domains of public law and private law is far from being analytically precise. 
Indeed, the lack of such precision has over the years produced calls to abandon 
the distinction altogether.48 Nonetheless, it captures important intuitions in 
legal thinking and analysis—about the role of the state, collectivist (versus 
individualist) ideals, and private action—that continue to exert influence.49 
Distilled down to its basics, public law implies a direct and central role 
for the state—as the protector of public welfare and public goals—in different 
aspects of the legal regime. This role can emerge in a variety of different ways, 
both structural and normative. Structurally, it has been seen to entail the state 
taking a direct role in the enforcement of legal directives (criminal law),50 the 
creation of vertical rights and duties between individuals and the government 
(constitutional law),51 or the horizontal relationship between different 
branches of the government (administrative law).52 Normatively, it has come 
to include situations where an area of law is structured and driven primarily 
by the “public interest,” such that the resolution of private disputes is about 
the vindication of public policy.53 This is in contrast to private law, wherein 
the state plays an indirect role and the law focuses instead on the horizontal 
 
48 See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1349, 1349 (1982) (noting the “decline” of the public/private distinction); John Henry Merryman, The 
Public Law-Private Law Distinction in European and American Law, 17 J. PUB. L. 3, 4 (1968) (“The public 
law-private law distinction is not taken as seriously in the United States.”); Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, 
Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843, 844 
(2006) (identifying the frequent assumption that “all law is public law”); Pound, supra note 9, at 469 
(“Public law	.	.	.	is gradually eating up private law.” (quoting William Ivor Jennings, The Institutional 
Theory, in MODERN THEORIES OF LAW 68, 72 (Humphrey Milford ed., 1933)). 
49 For uses of the distinction, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1976); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law 
Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 790-91 (1991); Daniel 
A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New 
Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875, 876 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of 
Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1436 (1988). 
50 See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Private/Public Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 
1424 (1982) (identifying criminal law as public law). 
51 See id. (identifying constitutional law as public law). 
52 See Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 620 (1927) 
[hereinafter Frankfurter, Administrative Law] (classifying administrative law as an area of public law). 
53 See Chayes, supra note 49, at 1284 (identifying the rise of “public law litigation” in federal 
court); George P. Fletcher, Remembering Gary—and Tort Theory, 50 UCLA L. REV. 279, 289 (2002) 
(“[T]he resolution of private disputes is supposed to further the public interest.”); Leon Green, Tort 
Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1959) (emphasizing that courts do and should 
consider the interests of “we the people” in adjudicating private disputes). 
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relationship and interaction between private parties.54 Both structurally and 
normatively, private law operates between private actors. 
In its functioning, U.S. copyright law today manifests its public law 
orientation in multiple ways, both normative and structural. The normative 
dimension relates to the way in which the law’s purposes are understood, 
constructed, and instantiated into individual doctrine, while the structural 
relates to the substantive and institutional content of copyright doctrine. 
Three key attributes of the contemporary copyright landscape highlight its 
emergent public law orientation. 
A. Private Right for a Public Purpose 
The dominant justification for U.S. copyright law today is utilitarian, 
deriving from the language of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.55 In 
this understanding, “[t]he purpose of copyright is to create incentives for 
creative effort.”56 All the same, such individual creative effort is worthwhile 
only because it inures to the overall public benefit, or as one court put it, “The 
economic philosophy behind	.	.	.	copyright[] is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance 
public welfare	.	.	.	.”57 Individual creative activity is seen as worthy of 
encouragement for its role in advancing public welfare. This public-regarding 
utilitarian logic therefore recognizes the existence of a causal and hierarchical 
relationship between the generation of a private benefit and the enhancement 
of overall public welfare. Copyright jurisprudence regards the private benefit 
the law produces as a “secondary consideration,”58 while the benefits to the 
public form its “primary object.”59 Discussions of the modern copyright 
system today underscore this utilitarian, public-oriented logic, giving it the 
aura of an uncontested dogma.60 
 
54 Chayes, supra note 49, at 1282-83. 
55 See U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cl. 1, 8 (“Congress shall have Power	.	.	.	[t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing	.	.	.	to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”). 
56 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984). 
57 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (emphasis added). 
58 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). 
59 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932). 
60 See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (noting that in copyright “the limited grant is a means by 
which an important public purpose may be achieved”); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“[P]rivate motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad 
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”); NEIL W. NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S 
PARADOX 81-84 (2008) (describing modern copyright law as an “engine of free expression”). For an 
argument that copyright law is not utilitarian enough, see Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian 
Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609 (2006).  
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As understood in this justification, the private interests of the parties 
directly affected by the copyright system—authors, owners, and potential 
copiers—are little more than the means identified by Congress (via the 
Constitution) to realize an ultimate end. These private interests have, to 
copyright, no independent justification beyond the overall public-regarding 
purpose that they serve in enhancing the public welfare.61 The end justifies 
the means, which has no separate reason for existence. Modern copyright’s 
normative orientation is therefore collectivist, public-focused, and associated 
with a clear policy goal: inducing greater creativity through a private benefit 
at minimal social cost, for the benefit of the public. A direct consequence of 
modern copyright’s focus on its public welfare policy has been that its internal 
doctrinal mechanisms— its rules, concepts, and principles—have assumed a 
secondary status to the overall collectivist goal. In other words, when there is 
a conflict between this external policy and the internal rules and principles of 
copyright, the latter is understood as needing to accommodate the former and 
not vice-versa. Copyright’s internal logic is thus dependent on its overall 
collectivist policy. 
The normative supremacy of copyright’s public welfare policy is more 
than just of rhetorical significance. To the contrary, it actually impacts the 
way in which courts adjudicating copyright disputes prioritize policy 
considerations, which are invariably collectivist in orientation, over those 
deriving from principles relating to individual rights and liability. Established 
principles of copyright, such as the fact-expression distinction (i.e., the 
exclusion of facts from protection),62 the merger doctrine,63 originality,64 or 
the use of a “reasonable observer”65 standard for the infringement analysis are 
routinely recast (artificially) as emanating from copyright’s overall policy goal 
determined for it by Congress, and having little independent salience on their 
own. Even independent of such recasting, courts make reference to 
copyright’s “policy” commitment to the “common good” when attempting to 
 
61 See ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? 17-19 (2015) (noting the 
limitations of this approach); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright: 
Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1664 (2012) (criticizing this trend).  
62 See, e.g., Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1542 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that the exclusion of 
facts from protection “do[es] not come straight from first principles” but is instead a policy).  
63 See, e.g., CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 73 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (finding that “a withholding of the merger doctrine would not seriously impair the policy 
of the copyright law . . . .”). 
64 See id. at 66 (noting that “there is no reason under the policies of the copyright law to demand 
a high degree of originality”); DRASSINOWER, supra note 61, at 17-19. 
65 See Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that “the 
policy underlying the ordinary observer test requires a recognition of the limits of the ordinary lay 
observer characterization of the ordinary observer test”). 
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resolve conflicts between competing principles in individual cases.66 The ideal 
of overall public welfare therefore looms large in the actual functioning of 
modern copyright law, even in individual cases. 
In relying on the private enforcement (of individual rights) to realize its 
public-regarding (collectivist) goals, copyright is of course in good company. 
Decades ago, tort scholars identified a similar change in discourse within tort 
law, which they characterized as tort law’s move to “public law.”67 The shift 
from a singular focus on the rights and duties of the parties involved in a 
dispute to the overall public policy sought to be realized in the enforcement 
of the law at hand was central to this characterization. A similar trend was 
seen in contract law, which scholars treated as a conferral of public power to 
individuals, which “could be justified only by public purposes.”68 More 
recently, political scientists have come to see this structure as a conscious 
design choice deployed by Congress in different contexts.69 By creating a set 
of private rights and setting up an incentive mechanism for private actors to 
enforce those rights, Congress realizes several of its overall (public) policy 
goals through a cost-effective and politically expedient mechanism: private 
litigation to vindicate public values.70 Implicit in such deliberate design is the 
recognition that the regime so created is indelibly a form of public law, given 
the omnipresence of Congress’s ultimate aim. 
Given the rhetorical, analytical, and justificatory primacy of copyright’s 
overall public welfare goal, the modern copyright statute might therefore well 
be understood as representing a similar mechanism wherein Congress is 
attempting to realize a public goal (of generating creative expression at 
minimal cost) through the creation of private incentives and benefits. As an 
analogy, consider a situation wherein a legislative body decides that 
automobile accidents are bad for society (owing to some public-oriented 
reason) and develops a mechanism to deter such accidents through the 
creation of a private action for an individual harmed by an accident to recover. 
 
66 CCC Info. Servs., 44 F.3d at 66. 
67 For an account of tort law’s public law shift, see generally Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law 
in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1959); Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise-II, 38 TEX. L. 
REV. 257 (1960). For arguments in favor of this public law shift, see generally David Rosenberg, The 
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
849 (1984). For doubts about this shift and its “surrender [of] the individual to the demands of ” 
public welfare, see George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 537-
40, 556-73 (1972).  
68 Horwitz, supra note 50, at 1426; see also id. (describing this trend in the 1930s and 1940s).  
69 See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE 
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 3 (2010) (asserting that Congress makes “a legislative choice to rely upon 
private litigation in statutory implementation”); ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: 
THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE 3 (2001) (defining this phenomenon as “adversarial legalism”). 
70 FARHANG, supra note 69, at 3-5. 
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In this model, it certainly would be the case that individuals who suffer harm 
(from accidents) recover and are benefited privately, yet the system is self-
consciously not about individual plaintiffs and defendants—whom it treats as 
a means to an end—and necessarily contingent on the overall enterprise of 
“social engineer[ing].”71 To put the point most bluntly, if the legislature were 
to one day decide that there is in fact a better and more effective way to realize 
the same policy goal (of reducing accidents—e.g., criminal law), it would find 
little reason to hold on to the model of private liability for accidents.72  
And so it is with copyright law too, in the modern understanding. 
Copyright’s private liability apparatus and the principles undergirding it are 
seen as entirely subsidiary to the primary ideal of promoting overall creativity 
and enhancing the public welfare. The means identified are unquestionably 
secondary to the primacy of the end.  
B. Market Regulation as a Goal 
The modern copyright system’s logic of focusing on the public interest 
(i.e., public welfare) as its normative goal finds further instantiation in the 
manner in which the system is actually structured. Instead of just focusing on 
the provision of an inducement to create and ensuring that creative expression 
is indeed generated as a result of such inducement, current copyright law goes 
significantly further by constructing the very terms of the market for 
expression so produced, in certain domains. Consider in this regard the reality 
that after setting out the subject matter that can obtain protection and the 
scope of such protection through its delineation of exclusive rights, the 
copyright statute recognizes that for various categories of protected subject 
matter, market transactions need further regulation and facilitation.73  
Consequently, in a variety of contexts, the statute sets up comprehensive 
systems of “compulsory” and “statutory” licensing schemes, under which a 
user of the work is allowed to use a protected work upon the payment of a 
 
71 See Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer as a Social Engineer, 3 J. PUB. L. 292, 292 (1954) (defining 
“social engineer[ing]” as the activity of making a social process realize its purpose with “a minimum 
of friction and waste”). 
72 Indeed, this was the argument of two prominent tort scholars. See Walter J. Blum & Harry 
Kalven, Jr., Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem—Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 641, 723 (1964) (offering a similar argument and concluding that “[p]rivate law cannot borrow 
goals from public law fields without accepting the obligation to make a proper public law analysis”).  
73 See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2018) (addressing secondary transmissions); 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2018) (sound 
recordings); 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2018) (nondramatic musical works); 17 U.S.C. § 116 (2018) (coin-
operated phonorecord players); 17 U.S.C. § 118 (2018) (noncommercial broadcasting); 17 U.S.C. § 
119 (2018) (distant television programming by satellite); 17 U.S.C. § 122 (2018) (local television 
programming by satellite). 
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determined royalty.74 These licensing schemes delineate the conditions that 
must be met for parties to invoke them, the scope of the license obtained, and 
in addition the manner in which the royalty is to be computed.75 As if this 
were not enough, the statute even creates a specialized body—the Copyright 
Royalty Tribunal—under the authority of the Copyright Office, and vests it 
with power to determine fair royalties for various licensing schemes.76 Not 
only are these mechanisms detailed and complex, but they are also highly 
tailored and specific to particular industries and at times even sub-groups 
within industries, reflective of the industry-level compromises that came to 
be reflected in the 1976 Act.77  
Scholars have previously documented this regulatory turn in the 1976 Act 
and in modifications to it since. Indeed, some have even predicted that this 
approach would continue to dominate copyright lawmaking in the years to come. 
In very prescient terms, Peter Menell noted how copyright had effectively 
become a “regulatory regime” and compared it to the evolution of environmental 
regulation, where government controls in the marketplace in pursuit of a 
collective goal had become the norm.78 Joseph Liu has similarly described this 
post-1976 turn in copyright law as the move towards a form of “regulatory 
copyright.”79 Regulatory copyright is characterized by its complexity and detail, 
industry-specific rules, and unique institutional features.80  
What it also reveals, however, is the injection of additional policy goals 
into the working of the copyright system, beyond the ideal of enhancing 
public welfare through the production of creative expression, all under the 
rubric of regulating the market for creative expression. These include policies 
relating to: the ideal industry-structure in certain creative domains (industrial 
policy);81 the role of copyright in fostering innovative means of 
 
74 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2018) (statutory licensing scheme for secondary transmissions by 
cable systems); 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2018) (same for sound recordings); 17 U.S.C. § 116 (2018) (same for 
coin-operated phonorecord players). 
75 Id. 
76 17 U.S.C. § 801 (2018). 
77 For a full account of these compromises and their translation into legislative provisions, see 
Litman, supra note 2, at 870-79. 
78 Menell, supra note 43, at 194-97.  
79 Liu, supra note 43, at 102-03. 
80 Id. at 103-05. 
81 For a discussion of industry structure, product differentiation, and entry, see Randal C. 
Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423, 423-25 
(2002); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 220-25 
(2004); see also PETER BALDWIN, THE COPYRIGHT WARS: THREE CENTURIES OF TRANS-
ATLANTIC BATTLE 17 (2016) (noting how American copyright law is perceived as being an 
instrument of “industrial policy”). 
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communication (communications policy);82 and the copyright system’s 
support for digital self-help technologies (digital rights management 
(“DRM”) policy),83 just to name a few. 
Going back to our automobile accident analogy, the modern copyright 
regime is therefore analogous to one where Congress decides not just to 
institute a form of private liability for accidents, but also further (i) 
determines the actual rules that drivers must follow to avoid such liability; 
(ii) mandates a system of insurance for compensation; (iii) specifies how such 
insurance should be obtained; and also (iv) creates a body to determine 
insurance payouts when an accident occurs. A regime such as this could quite 
justifiably be characterized as a regime of “public law” accident regulation, 
rather than a regime of tort law.84 
Beyond its structural component, the modern copyright regime’s growing 
focus on regulating the market for creative expression also introduces new 
normative goals into the functioning of the system. Those goals originate in 
the very ideal of “regulation” and encompass both economic and noneconomic 
considerations. Notably, all of the considerations are driven by a conception 
of the “public interest,” which in turn self-consciously adopts a collectivist 
stance.85 The regulation of the market for creative expression is therefore a 
presumptively public goal—seeking to serve the collective interests of creators, 
copiers, and the general public. 
C. Divided (and Coordinated) Lawmaking 
A third feature of the modern public law model of copyright is structural 
and originates in its presumptive adherence to the constitutional ideal of 
“separation of powers.”86 The modern copyright system is characterized by a 
 
82 For an account of copyright’s communications policy and its development, see generally 
Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278 (2004). 
83 For more about the intersection of DRM and copyright, see Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual 
Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 537-46 (1999) (criticizing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s anti-
circumvention rules); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Communications’ Copyright Policy, 4 J. TELECOMM. 
& HIGH TECH. L. 97, 99, 105-13 (2005) (discussing the benefits of DRM for “good copyright policy”). 
84 See Blum & Kalven, supra note 72, at 642-46 (characterizing such a regime as an “auto[mobile] 
compensation plan”). 
85 For prominent accounts of regulation and the role of public interest therein, see STEPHEN 
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 22-25 (1982); MIKE FEINTUCK, ‘THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST’ IN REGULATION 35 (2004); Michael	Hantke-Domas, The Public Interest Theory of 
Regulation: Non-Existence or Misinterpretation?, 15 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 165, 172-78 (2003); Sidney A. 
Shapiro, Keeping the Baby and Throwing out the Bathwater: Justice Breyer's Critique of Regulation, 8 
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 721, 734 (1995).  
86 For overviews of U.S. separation of powers doctrine and its precepts, see John F. Manning, 
Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1950-71 (2011), which discusses 
the modern U.S. approach to separation of powers, and Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of 
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division of lawmaking authority among different institutional bodies within 
the system. As copyright thinking came to be infused with collectivist ideals 
and regulatory goals, the complexity that it generated was seen to necessitate 
a division of responsibility among different institutions, each of which 
emphasizes a different aspect of the public interest.87 This trend continues 
unabated to this day. While this division of authority produces an obvious 
fragmentation in the regime’s conception of law, it has also necessitated the 
development of mechanisms of interbranch coordination for the regime to 
function, or rules of administrative copyright law. 
The public law model assumes the supremacy of Congress in the realm of 
copyright lawmaking.88 While Congress has always been formally responsible 
for the blackletter of copyright law (i.e., the statute), the modern trend has 
seen Congress reassert its lawmaking role in the copyright domain, by 
attempting to weigh in—albeit imperfectly—on most aspects of copyright 
doctrine.89 Courts, for their part, have moderated their own lawmaking role 
accordingly, to give effect to this trend and thereby acknowledged the reality 
that Congress may be better suited to ascertaining the “public interest” and 
giving effect to the balancing that it necessitates.90 Beginning with Justice 
Brandeis’ infamous recognition that “[c]ourts are ill-equipped” to make public 
interest determinations in the realm of intellectual property law, and that they 
are “powerless” to construct the machinery and regulations needed to make 
such considerations real,91 courts in the public law model approach copyright 
 
Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 640 (2000), which identifies the purported goals of U.S. separation 
of powers doctrine as the protection and promotion of democracy, professional competence and 
fundamental rights. 
87 See generally Robert E. Goodin, Institutionalizing the Public Interest: The Defense of Deadlock and 
Beyond, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 331 (1996) (discussing the connection between the public interest 
and divided lawmaking). 
88 This is unexceptional in light of the Constitution’s express grant of copyright lawmaking 
authority, under Article I, to Congress. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Nothing about this constitutional 
provision has changed since the founding era, yet under the public law model it has come to be given 
an unequivocal reading that favors congressional supremacy in the area. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcoft, 537 
U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (“[W]e are not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy 
judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”). 
89 See Christopher S. Yoo, The Impact of Codification on the Judicial Development of Copyright, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 177, 177 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) 
(“[M]odern copyright has been widely acknowledged to be statutory in nature.”). 
90 See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 335 (2012) (concluding that “[t]he 
judgment	.	.	.	expresse[d by Congress in the statute] lies well within the ken of the political 
branches” and that the Court’s only “obligation, of course, [is] to determine whether the action 
Congress took, wise or not, encounters any constitutional shoal”); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208 (refusing 
“to second-guess congressional determinations”). 
91 Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 267 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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adjudication as primarily and overtly an exercise in statutory interpretation.92 
Copyright’s collectivist ideals are presumptively congressionally determined, 
and taken to lie within (or behind) the terms of the copyright statute. Even 
when developing the law as a matter of first impression, they strive to render 
their reasoning compatible with Congress’s presumptive grand plan for the 
public welfare, as supposedly captured in the copyright statute.93 
Beyond recalibrating the legislative-judicial dynamic, the public law model 
of copyright also places unprecedented faith in the role of an expert agency—
the Copyright Office—to guide both Congress and the courts on matters of 
copyright.94 The Office is vested with a variety of functions under the 
statute,95 in the exercise of which it regularly intervenes as an expert agency 
in major court cases,96 engages in administrative rulemaking exercises,97 and 
perhaps most importantly, interprets and supplements statutes and case law 
on important doctrinal questions of copyright law, a practice that has received 
the tacit approval of courts and Congress.98 This last practice is particularly 
important to appreciate, since it operates today as an independent—and 
significantly persuasive—formal source of copyright law.99 Coupled with the 
 
92 See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 530 (2013) (relying on statutory 
“language,” “context,” and “common-law history” to interpret a provision, instead of policy 
considerations). But see Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Equity's Unstated 
Domain: The Role of Equity in Shaping Copyright Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1859, 1860-61 (2015) (arguing 
that even with this approach, courts have relied on mechanisms of discretion to increase their role). 
93 For a prominent example, see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). While 
the Court developed the “transformative use” doctrine variant of fair use in common law fashion in 
Campbell, it nonetheless emphasized the need to render its reasoning compatible with the four fair use 
factors contained in § 107 of the copyright statute. Id. at 578-94; see also ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 
U.S. 431, 438-45 (2014) (approaching the question of whether a new technology is a public performance 
under the law as entirely a matter of presumptive congressional intent and policy). 
94 17 U.S.C. § 701 (2018). 
95 Id. § 701(b).  
96 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Star 
Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017) (No. 15-866), 2016 WL 5116853; Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 
431 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 828079; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-
480), 2005 WL 154148. 
97 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 702 (2018) (vesting the power to make regulations with the Copyright 
Office); 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2018) (vesting rulemaking power under the DMCA with the 
Copyright Office). For an example of a rule made under these powers, see 37 C.F.R. § 201.4 (2020) 
(prescribing requirements for the recordations of copyright ownership transfers). 
98 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at 2 (“Courts have cited the 
Compendium in numerous copyright cases.”); id. § 101.1 (“[The Office] provides expert subject matter 
assistance to Congress on copyright policy and interpretation of the copyright law . . . .”). 
99 For cases placing express reliance on the Compendium, see Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star 
Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 480 (6th Cir. 2015); Olem Shoe Corp. v. Washington Shoe Corp., 591 
F. App’x 873, 882 n.10 (11th Cir. 2015); Batjac Prods. Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 160 
F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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crucial role that the Office plays in registering individual works,100 its 
interpretation of copyright doctrine assumes a level of everyday importance 
to the functioning of the copyright system that is often underappreciated. 
The net effect of the public law model’s institutional dynamic of 
separation of powers is that approaching any question of copyright law now 
requires an account of the interaction and coordination between these 
different lawmaking branches, in order to understand an issue. The public 
law-based rules of engagement between these agencies on issues of copyright 
law101 have thereby become an integral part of the landscape of copyright law.  
* * * 
In its (i) emphasis on collectivist public welfare over private right, (ii) 
attempt to regulate the marketplace for creative expression, and (iii) use of a 
disaggregated framework of lawmaking, modern copyright law thus embodies a 
strong public law dimension to its functioning, one that is rarely acknowledged.  
The public law orientation of modern copyright exerts a significant—but 
unappreciated—influence on the working of the system, its self-
understanding of its goals, and the public’s perception of its successes and 
failures. It contributes to the extensive confusion that permeates copyright’s 
justificatory debates by injecting a new set of public-regarding ideas and 
variables into the conversation, all of which are routinely seen to be in 
opposition to—rather than compatible with—copyright’s private benefits.102 
In the process, the goal of a “balance” between the public and private thus 
emerges as central.103 Additionally, the complexity underlying the regulatory 
landscape of public law copyright endorses the view that copyright law is to 
be understood as an autonomous body of law. Copyright law expertise is today 
seen as independent from general legal/administrative expertise.  
 The U.S. public law conception of copyright is of modern vintage, and 
something of an outlier in the global copyright system. It is, however, the 
product of important changes in general legal thinking and analysis that 
occurred in America over the course of the last century, and which came to 
influence the copyright discourse as well. Examining the process through 
which this occurred sheds important light on what exactly this complicated 
and seemingly sprawling public law framework for copyright is intended to 
 
100 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2018). 
101 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 30 (1985) 
(describing the purpose of administrative law as relating to the behavior of public officials). 
102 See ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 3-4 (2010) (discussing this general oppositional stance). 
103 Id. at 1-2; see also Peter B. Maggs, The Balance of Copyright in the United States of America, 58 
AM. J. COMP. L. 369, 371 (2010). 
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realize, and how its functioning might be better appreciated and refined. It is 
to this task that the next two Parts turn.  
II. THE PRIVATE LAW CONCEPTION OF COPYRIGHT 
Through most of its history American copyright law adopted a relatively 
straightforward understanding of its functioning, premised on its structure as 
a private right directed at governing the horizontal interaction between 
creators and copiers through a regime of civil liability. In this private law 
conception, copyright law and reasoning came to focus on governing the 
rights of creators, the correlative duties of potential copiers, the wrongdoing 
that a breach of these duties entailed, and the various immunities and 
defenses that copiers could avail themselves of. The law therefore emphasized 
its governance of the legal relationship between copyright plaintiff (creator) 
and copyright defendant (copier) and derived its normative ideals from 
within the contours of that relationship. 
Put in slightly more abstract terms, the analytical focus of the private law 
conception was its reliance on criteria internal to copyright for its analysis 
and reasoning. Often characterized as the distinction between “principles” 
and “policy,” the contrast between the two is well documented in the 
literature.104 A policy refers to an external “goal to be reached” through the 
use of a rule or doctrine and treats the law in avowedly instrumental terms 
(e.g., the goal of reducing automobile accidents through a liability regime).105 
Arguments from policy are most commonly collectivist in orientation.106 By 
contrast, a principle refers to a norm that mandates something based on 
considerations of “justice or fairness” that make no appeal to external criteria 
(e.g., preventing a wrongdoer from benefiting from the wrongdoing) but are 
instead taken to be embedded within the law itself.107 Principle-based 
arguments are usually couched as arguments of “right.”108 An argument from 
welfare is the archetypical policy-based reason, while one based on equality 
is a paradigmatic principle-driven one. The private law conception of 
 
104 The classical account is that of Dworkin. See Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 14, 23 (1967) [hereinafter Dworkin, Model of Rules]; see also RONALD DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82-84 (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]. 
For a broad overview and analysis of Dworkin’s account, see generally Donald H. Regan, Glosses on 
Dworkin: Rights, Principles, and Policies, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1213 (1978).  
105 Dworkin, Model of Rules, supra note 104, at 23.  
106 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 104, at 82 (noting how arguments of 
policy focus on showing that the decision “advances or protects some collective goals of the 
community as a whole”) 
107 Dworkin, Model of Rules, supra note 104, at 23. 
108 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 104, at 82. 
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copyright revealed an unabashed emphasis on the internal logic of copyright, 
and thereby extolled the search for copyright principles.  
The private law conception manifested itself in copyright jurisprudence 
and reasoning in three distinctive ways. First, it treated copyright as an 
individual right, vested in the author and with correlative obligations (duties) 
imposed on others. Very importantly, this emphasis was more than just 
rhetorical. Adjudicating copyright cases entailed an explication of the 
regime’s myriad doctrines through the use of the right-duty structure. In so 
doing, such explication routinely gave doctrines a rationale that appeared self-
evident, naturalistic, and on occasion immanent109 (i.e., internal). 
Second, to the extent that copyright’s purpose was ever discussed in the 
jurisprudence, it was seen as always connected to the right-duty structure of 
copyright. Courts and scholars treated copyright’s goals as either embedded 
within the institution’s right-duty structure, or instead as flowing normatively 
therefrom. Rarely ever was copyright’s public-regarding purpose seen as 
independently defensible in a manner that rendered its doctrinal apparatus 
wholly contingent; the interests of the plaintiff and defendant thus informed—
and constrained—the construction of copyright’s purposes in the discourse.  
Third, the judicial development of copyright doctrine focused very little 
on locating a legislative intent—either actual or implied—to answer a 
question directly, despite acknowledging the statutory basis for copyright (an 
exception was of course when the issue itself was purely interpretive in 
nature). Courts and scholars focused instead on deciding copyright cases 
using precedent-based “principles” that they developed and declared, or by 
focusing on the unique factual specificities of a case, which they used to 
expound the doctrine.110 This certainly did not mean that they ignored the 
statute altogether—just that they showed it little deference. This 
underemphasis on legislation had both an institutional and a substantive 
implication. Institutionally, it validated the role of courts as active lawmakers 
in the field, who policed copyright doctrine through principles and fact-
specific determinations; substantively, it enabled courts to embrace 
transsubstantivity in their willingness to treat copyright law as connected to 
 
109 See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Immanent Rationality of Copyright Law, 115 MICH. 
L. REV. 1047 (2017) (book review) (discussing the merits and downsides of such an approach to 
copyright); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 
(1988) (defining and defending an immanent approach to legal analysis).  
110 See Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 601, 613-21 (1993) (discussing the centrality of principles in legal reasoning across 
different schools of American legal thought). 
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other areas of the law and capable of drawing therefrom, rather than as a 
hermetically sealed area.111 
While some elements of the private law conception of copyright law 
emerged in the decades immediately following the enactment of the first 
copyright statute in the U.S., it crystallized during the era of classical legal 
thought (or Legal Formalism), which developed its own distinctive legal 
consciousness by the last quarter of the nineteenth century.112 The same 
conception of copyright then continued to hold sway through the era of Legal 
Realism, an approach that emerged as a reaction to Legal Formalism and 
dominated American legal thinking beginning in the second third of the 
twentieth century.113 The discussion below is therefore isolated into two 
sequential phases, even though both embodied a largely similar conception of 
copyright law. 
A. Classical-Era Copyright Law 
Following the Civil War, American legal thinking came to develop a 
unique conception of law and legal institutions, one that is commonly (albeit 
pejoratively) referred to as “Legal Formalism.”114 Central to the consciousness 
underlying Legal Formalism was the idea that law was capable of being 
understood as an autonomous enterprise, independent in large (even if not all) 
measure from political power, social goals, and economic considerations.115  
Most accounts of Legal Formalism are usually associated with the legal 
theory of Christopher Columbus Langdell, a law professor and first dean of 
the Harvard Law School.116 Indeed, it is occasionally referred to as 
 
111 For a general discussion of inter-doctrinal borrowing, see Edward Rock & Michael 
Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. 
U. L. REV. 651 (2002).  
112 See KENNEDY, supra note 47, at 27 (defining “legal consciousness” as “the particular form of 
consciousness that characterizes the legal profession as a social group, at a particular moment”). 
113 See L. L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 429 (1934) (noting that 
Legal Realism reached its heyday around 1929). 
114 For accounts of the emergence of formalism post–Civil War, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 
9-10 (1992); Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 251, 251-54 
(1975). For characterizations of Legal Formalism, see GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN 
LAW 62 (1977); Daniel Farber, The Ages of American Formalism, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 92-93 (1995); 
Charles C. Goetsch, The Future of Legal Formalism, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 221, 221 (1980).  
115 GILMORE, supra note 114, at 62; HORWITZ, supra note 114, at 14-16; KENNEDY, supra note 
47, at 2-3. 
116 See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 114, at 128-29; BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE 
FORMALIST–REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 51-52 (2009); R. Blake Brown 
& Bruce A. Kimball, When Holmes Borrowed from Langdell: The “Ultra Legal” Formalism and Public 
Policy of Northern Securities (1904), 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 278, 278 (2001); Patrick J. Kelley, Holmes, 
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“Langdellianism,” given that Langdell’s approach epitomized almost all of the 
core attributes of Formalism.117 In his seminal work on Langdell’s theory, Tom 
Grey notes that the core of the theory lay in the idea that “law is a science.”118 
Grey argues that formalization, conceptual ordering, and the identification of 
core principles were essential features of the approach, which operated on the 
enduring assumption that individual rules could be “derived” or “deduced” 
from these principles.119 Overarching and open-ended considerations such as 
“justice and policy” were of relevance only insofar as they were embodied 
within principles that were capable of precise exposition and application.120 
In the Legal Formalist—or Classical—understanding, maintaining the 
divide between private law and public law was crucial.121 Whereas private law 
could be conceptually ordered in their “scientific” way and organized around 
abstract principles and categories, public law was seen as overtly political, 
“unscientific,” and “hopelessly vague.”122 The private law subjects of property, 
contract, and tort, all of common law origin, were treated as defining the very 
content of the law and capable of being rationalized through the development 
of legal principles articulated, developed, and applied by courts in individual 
cases. Scholars have argued that this emphasis on private law was a product 
of the Formalists’ attempt to protect the ideology of the individualist market 
and maintain the status quo, which favored business and commercial interests 
over collectivist ideals.123 Whether this actually occurred as an empirical 
matter or not,124 as an analytical matter Formalist analysis of legal doctrine 
certainly held collectivist and public-regarding ideals at bay in the 
development and refinement of doctrine. 
The Legal Formalist affinity for private law also caused them to develop a 
deep discomfort with legislation, which they saw as “haphazard.”125 Indeed, to 
Langdell the term “law” did not cover legislation, but was limited to “law as 
administered by courts of justice” in individual cases.126 The common law was 
 
Langdell and Formalism, 15 RATIO JURIS 26, 26 (2002); Bruce A. Kimball, Langdell on Contracts and 
Legal Reasoning: Correcting the Holmesian Caricature, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 345, 345-47 (2007). 
117 See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 11 (1995); Anthony 
Kronman, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 335 (1987). 
118 Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983). 
119 Id. at 6-11. 
120 Id. at 14-15. 
121 Id. at 47-48; see also HORWITZ, supra note 114, at 10-11. 
122 Grey, supra note 118, at 34. 
123 Id. at 33; see also HORWITZ, supra note 114, at 4-5. 
124 See Grey, supra note 118, at 34 (expressing doubt over the pro-business orientation of actual 
judicial decisions in this period). 
125 Id. at 34. 
126 Christopher Columbus Langdell, Dominant Opinions in England During the Nineteenth 
Century in Relation to Legislation as Illustrated by English Legislation, or the Absence of It, During That 
Period, 19 HARV. L. REV. 151, 151 (1906). 
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therefore structurally and normatively superior to legislation, given its ability to 
be rationalized through principles and categorized as such. When actually forced 
to grapple with the text of a statute, i.e., when the question itself was clearly 
covered by a provision, Formalists tended to be textualist in their approach, 
eschewing any effort to understand the purpose/policy behind the statute.127 
Classical-era Legal Formalism therefore exhibited a distinct preference 
for principle over policy, for judge-made law over statutes, and for private law 
over public law. Much of this translated into the copyright setting, but with 
some important modifications. Copyright is—and has always been—statutory 
in origin. The first Copyright Act was enacted in 1790, amended a few 
times,128 and then comprehensively revised in 1831 and 1870.129 Thus by the 
advent of the Classical era, there was little doubt that copyright was statutory 
as a matter of formal origin. Nevertheless, the conception of copyright in this 
era maintained its adherence to the overall Formalist credo, while 
acknowledging the statutory origin of the institution. We see this not just in 
the writings of scholars and treatise authors, but also in judicial formulations 
of copyright questions and disputes during the period. 
Writing in 1899, Langdell himself attempted to develop a private law 
account of copyright, which showcases the dominant Formalist approach of 
the time.130 An author’s right in his creation, to Langdell, was not a right 
conferred by the state, but instead a right “recognize[ed] and protect[ed]” by 
the state.131 The right—a “personal right”—had to be distinguished from a 
property right in the embodiment of the creation and was instead a right in 
the creation “regarded as an incorporeal thing,” which furnished the author 
with an “effective means of preventing the use and enjoyment of his 
creation	.	.	.	by others without his consent.”132 The source of the right was not 
the state, “but is deduced as a consequence of the creation.”133 The logic of 
copyright was thus to be found internal to the activity that formed the subject 
of the regime, i.e., creation. Crucially, the source of this logic was not the 
statute nor the mere idea of property, but instead taken to be “well settled by 
authority” and “clear upon principle.”134 That the act of creation ipso facto 
 
127 See Christopher Columbus Langdell, The Northern Securities Case and the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act, 16 HARV. L. REV. 539, 551 (1903) (noting that “a lawgiver is supposed to mean only what he 
says” in the context of the Sherman Act). 
128 See Act of May 31, 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-15, 1 Stat. 124. 
129 See Patent Act of 1870, Pub. L. No. 41-230, 16 Stat. 198 (revising the statutes related to 
patents and copyright); An Act to Amend the Several Acts Respecting Copyrights, Pub. L. No. 21-
16, § 14, 4 Stat. 436, 439 (1831) (repealing the Act of May 31, 1790).  
130 Langdell, supra note 11. 
131 Id. at 553. 
132 Id. at 553 n.2, 554. 
133 Id. at 554. 
134 Id. 
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could give rise to an exclusive right in the intangible matter underlying the 
creativity was taken to be a matter of principle rather than a product of 
statutory policy. The statute—and its policy—were therefore clearly 
relegated to an inferior position. What then of the obvious reality, which 
Langdell could certainly not deny, that there was in fact a copyright statute 
that unambiguously dealt with the subject, i.e., copyright? 
It is here that we see Langdell acknowledging a role for the state, but one 
that reaffirmed the naturalistic principles underlying his conception of 
copyright. He takes as “deemed settled by authority” the fact that the act of 
publication terminates the personal right to exclusivity that existed prior to 
publication.135 Langdell treats the precise source of this authority as 
irrelevant, given its settled nature.136 Upon such termination, the state 
“interfere[s]” in favor of the author “by issuing its prohibition against the use 
of his creation” and “arming him with the power to enforce such prohibition” 
through a law.137 This right so produced was “wholly independent” of 
property, “incorporeal” in structure and “radically different” from the pre-
publication right, which treated the creation as an incorporeal thing.138 In 
later work, Langdell supplemented this account by distinguishing between 
the common law (pre-publication) right and copyright and conceding that 
“copyright is conferred directly by statute.”139 Yet, this was not out of an 
external purpose. It was instead “as a partial atonement for the wrong done 
by the State in putting an end, upon publication” to the pre-publication right 
of the author.140 
In thus deducing the logic of copyright from the act of creativity and the 
common law’s naturalism, Langdell provides an early articulation of the 
private law conception of copyright. The right in copyright was a personal 
right that is “negative” in nature, i.e., “a right against some person or 
persons	.	.	.	not to have something done.”141 The role of the legislature was 
acknowledged, but heavily circumscribed and treated as normatively 
subsidiary to, and dependent on, the pre-legislation common law right. 
Additionally, the legislature’s motivations behind the enactment were treated 
as altogether immaterial to the deduction of copyright’s rationale and goals. 




137 Id. at 555. 
138 Id. 
139 Christopher Columbus Langdell, Classification of Rights and Wrongs, 13 HARV. L. REV. 537, 554 (1900). 
140 Id. at 555. 
141 Id. 
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“settled by authority,”142 a conscious equivocation with clear overtones of the 
judicial settlement of an issue through the common law process. 
Langdell’s account embodies all of the salient features of the private law 
conception of copyright, developed through Legal Formalism. It attempts to 
describe copyright as a “right” vested in an individual exclusively by virtue of 
that individual’s actions, eschews any search for external policies, focuses 
instead on deducing the rationale of copyright law using an immanent logic, 
and treats the law to be “settled by authority” quite independent of statute. 
Langdell’s account had little to say about individual copyright doctrines, given 
his focus on deriving an overall rationale for copyright. All the same, we see a 
similar conception at play in the work of copyright treatise writers who came 
to play a prominent role during this period given Formalism’s focus on 
categorization and the deduction of abstract principles from individual cases.143  
The most prominent copyright treatise of the Classical era was authored 
by Eaton Drone, in 1879.144 In true Formalist style, Drone characterized his 
task at the very outset as entailing the distillation, derivation, and explication 
of copyright’s fundamental principles in a systematic and scientific manner. 
In the preface to his book, he described his endeavor in the following terms: 
The task of the juridical writer is to set forth the true principles which 
govern the law; to point out the proper meaning of the statutes; to show what 
decisions are right and what are wrong; to explain what is doubtful or obscure; 
and, generally, to give the law in a form as true, clear, systematic, and harmonious 
as it is in his power to do.	.	.	.	Jurisprudence is a science based on principles 
rather than on single decisions. By the former rather than by the latter the law 
is to be determined. It is true that one as well as the other are made by judges, 
and that principles which are not judicially settled or recognized are without 
force. But principles are fundamental and general. On them decisions are 
grounded, by them governed, and with them must harmonize.145 
 
142 Langdell, supra note 11, at 554. 
143 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 251, 255-56 (1975) 
(describing the role of the treatise in the emergence of Legal Formalism).  
144 EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL 
PRODUCTIONS (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1879). Mention here might also be made of another 
copyright treatise, published in 1848 by George Ticknor Curtis. See GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1848). Even though written 
a little before the crystallization of Legal Formalism, it exhibits several of the same conceptual 
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In area after area, Drone then proceeded to describe his account of the 
law through the use of myriad “principles.”146 While he acknowledged the 
existence of the copyright statute, and occasionally discussed its provisions,147 
the statute as such received no additional deference. To the contrary, he 
criticized several of its provisions as “[m]eaningless, inconsistent, and 
inadequate,” and noted that copyright statutes had “been often drawn by 
incompetent persons.”148 
Drone’s treatment of the standard for copyright infringement—
“piracy”—is illustrative.149 The discussion begins by identifying the statutory 
provision at issue, which prohibited the printing, publication, importation, or 
sale of “any copy” of the original.150 Drone then notes that it is unclear 
whether the legislature intended to cover the “substance” of a work, or just 
its “verbatim” form, but proceeds rather quickly to the conclusion that 
“[t]hese and kindred questions have been left to the courts	.	.	.	to be 
determined by adjudicated principles.”151 The answer was thus to be found in 
the principles of copyright protection, not in an independent legislative 
purpose or intent. Accordingly, Drone deduces his answer through 
copyright’s structure, as follows: 
We must first understand what that is for which protection is given, before we 
can determine what is an unlawful use of it. It has been shown elsewhere that 
literary property is not limited to the precise form of words, the identical 
language, in which a composition is expressed, but that it is in the intellectual 
creation of which language is but a means of expression and communication. 
The same production may be expressed and communicated in various 
languages, without affecting its identity. The means of communication are 
changed; but the thing communicated remains the same. So, in the same 
language, the words may be varied; but the substantial identity of the 
composition is preserved. It is this intellectual production, and not merely one 
form of language in which it may be expressed, which is the fruit of the author's 
genius or mental labor. It is this which is his property, and to which the law 
guarantees protection. It is this whose unlawful appropriation is piracy.152  
Despite allusions to copyright’s purpose, the ultimate determinant of the 
doctrinal answer for Drone is seen to lie in the structure of the right 
 
146 Id. 
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150 Id. at 384. 
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2020] Copyright as Legal Process 1131 
underlying copyright and the object of protection. From the principle that 
intellectual creation generates a right in the “fruit[s]” of the creation, the 
scope of the infringement analysis is thus determined to extend to non-
verbatim copies as well.153 
Perhaps the most direct—and impactful—instantiation of the private law 
conception during the Classical era was to be seen in the judicial opinions of 
the period. As scholars have noted, the Legal Formalism of this period took 
shape principally in the manner in which courts adopted a “narrower, 
deductive approach to decision-making whereby legal relationships were 
treated as somehow subsumed under a small collection of fundamental legal 
principles.”154 Within copyright, this Formalism contributed directly to the 
crystallization of the private law conception wherein copyright was treated as 
a naturalistic private right, immune from external policy considerations 
including those espoused by Congress, and to be developed through 
“principled” reasoning. 
In his magisterial work on the evolution of authorship in the nineteenth 
century, Oren Bracha notes how during the Classical era, judges “recoiled” from 
infusing the originality doctrine with overt policy considerations, preferring 
instead to confine their reasoning to the innate logic of presumptively neutral 
principles.155 Bracha argues that this trend was in keeping with the judicial self-
imagery of Legal Formalism, wherein judges chose not to be seen as engaged 
in policymaking and social engineering (as they once had in a prior era).156 For 
our purposes, Bracha’s claim also confirms the logic behind the entrenchment 
of the private law conception of copyright in this period. By eschewing 
considerations of social value and public welfare directly, and by preferring to 
focus on the neutrality of principles as applied to the case at hand, judicial 
reasoning forced itself into the exercise of emphasizing the particularized 
claims and concerns of the parties before the court, i.e., the plaintiff and 
defendant. And in so doing, such reasoning showcased the horizontal, rights-
driven nature of copyright as a private claim, rather than its functioning as an 
instrument of broader social policy. Indeed, we see this to be true when we 
examine some of the well-known Supreme Court opinions of the period, many 
of which went well beyond the doctrine of originality. 
Consider in this vein the celebrated case of Baker v. Selden.157 Written 
during the Classical era, it showcases the working of the private law 
conception. At issue was the question of whether the plaintiff, who had 
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described a new method of bookkeeping in a monograph, could use copyright 
law to prevent a defendant from using that method.158 The Court framed the 
issue thus as whether the plaintiff ’s copyright gave him an “exclusive right to 
the use of the system” described in the book.159 Baker is understood to have 
unequivocally confirmed the proposition that copyright does not so give its 
claimant an exclusive right to the use of the underlying method or process. 
Indeed, it is commonly treated as an early instantiation of copyright’s rule 
excluding functionality from the gamut of protection,160 a rule that has since 
been expanded in multiple ways and is today understood as embodying 
crucial public-regarding goals relating to the protection of a vibrant public 
domain,161 the encouragement of free speech,162 and the facilitation of 
derivative creativity.163 Yet, Baker itself makes no appeal to such public-
regarding policy goals and purposes to arrive at its conclusion; indeed Baker 
places surprisingly scant reliance on any purpose for copyright. Instead, it 
bases its reasoning explicitly on the “principle” underlying copyright’s 
exclusive right, and the rationale that a claim to the “description” (i.e., 
expression) of some teaching in a book “lays no foundation for an exclusive 
claim” to the teaching itself.164 Nor does the Court attempt to find a legislative 
basis for its conclusion, despite the reality that the plaintiff ’s claim—of 
copyright infringement—was clearly derived from a statute. Baker’s 
principled logic exemplifies the right-duty focus of the private law conception 
in this period and its naturalistic predisposition towards copyright that 
rejected an outward search for purpose/policy and legislative guidance. The 
search was entirely internal to copyright law and its structure of rights. 
Baker also highlights an additional reality about the private law conception 
of copyright during this era, namely that it did not necessarily favor plaintiffs 
and rightsholders at the cost of defendants and the general public. As noted 
previously, the standard historical account of Classical-era jurisprudence and 
Legal Formalism has argued that the private law reasoning seen in this period 
was driven in large measure by an ideological desire to serve the market and 
business interests, by preserving the status quo.165 It is thus distinctly treated 
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as antiprogressive in orientation. To the extent that Baker represents the 
private law conception, it shows us that at least within copyright the private law 
conception of the regime appears to have likely had relatively little such 
ideological motivation behind its adoption. This certainly doesn't refute the 
existence of such an ideological basis behind the overall jurisprudence of the 
Classical era. The private law conception of copyright that emerged in this 
era was instead quite likely the unwitting result of an approach to reasoning 
that may have originated with a certain ideological/political valence in other 
common law contexts.  
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,166 decided by the Court shortly 
after Baker, adopted the same approach in reaffirming the private law 
conception. The case is understood as having confirmed the copyrightability 
of photographs.167 The question presented to the Court was whether 
Congress had the authority to cover photographs in the copyright statute, in 
light of the language of the specific language used in the Copyright Clause of 
the Constitution.168 Being expressly called upon to review Congress’s power 
to enact copyright law, the Court unhesitatingly embraced the task and 
identified limitations on that power.169 Very interestingly, its focus was not 
on the purpose-driven and public-regarding limits embodied in the language 
of the Constitution (“promote the progress”170) but on the supposedly 
principled limitations contained therein, namely, the concepts of “authorship” 
and “writing.”171 In concluding that photographs satisfied these conceptual 
criteria, Burrow-Giles nonetheless affirmed a naturalistic approach to 
copyright, at one point even referencing a freestanding “nature of 
copyright,”172 described as “the exclusive right of a man to the production of 
his own genius or intellect,”173 which it saw as applicable to photographs with 
little difficulty. Copyright’s purpose was thus taken to lie internal to the act 
of authorship, which on its own was the very logic for protection. Legislative 
policy or public goals as such deserved no independent deference. 
A third landmark decision from this period highlights the compatibility 
of the private law conception of copyright with the statutory basis for 
copyright. The case of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus174 is credited with having 
 
166 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
167 Christine H. Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright's Response to the Invention of Photography, 
65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 389-90 (2004); Justin Hughes, The Photographer’s Copyright—Photograph as 
Art, Photograph as Database, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 339, 340 (2012). 
168 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 55. 
169 Id. at 56-59. 
170 U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
171 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58, 61. 
172 Id. at 58. 
173 Id. 
174 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
1134 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 1101 
created the “first sale”175 doctrine, which exempts owners of lawful copies of 
a work from the reach of the distribution right when they resell or otherwise 
distribute those copies to others. The plaintiff publisher in Bobbs-Merrill had 
inserted a notice on the first page of its books, forbidding purchasers from 
reselling them below a certain price and threatening to treat such resales 
(below the said price) as copyright infringement.176 When a purchaser 
breached the condition, the plaintiff claimed that this amounted to 
infringement of its “sole right of vending the copyrighted book.”177 In 
considering the issue, the Court conceded that it was “purely a question of 
statutory construction” wherein it was merely “ascertaining the legislative 
intent in its enactment.”178 Nonetheless in actually addressing the issue, the 
Court’s actual reasoning does little to distill any legislative history or 
statutory purpose, beyond quoting large portions of the statute.179 It 
eventually concluded that allowing a plaintiff to unilaterally expand the scope 
of infringement through a declaration was “beyond [the statute’s] 
meaning.”180 But why, precisely? Hidden within the Court’s reference to 
meaning and intent lies its real rationale: the plaintiff ’s actions would “qualify 
the title of a future purchaser” even when there was “no privity of contract,”181 
something that was at odds with the common law’s discomfort with equitable 
servitudes on chattels.182 The Court’s logic was thus unquestionably a matter 
of principle, internal to the interaction between copyright and property law 
and relating to the scope of the parties’ respective horizontal rights.  
In the end then, the Court in Bobbs-Merrill restricted the scope of the 
plaintiff ’s exclusivity.183 And it did so by locating copyright’s primary purpose 
in giving an author/owner the ability to restrict the multiplication of copies, 
and little more. As the Court acknowledged, “[T]he nature of the property 
and the protection intended to be given the inventor or author as the reward 
of genius or intellect in the production of his book or work of art is to be 
considered in construing the act of Congress . . . .”184 But, the Court observed, 
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“[I]t is evident that to secure the author the right to multiply copies of his 
work may be said to have been the main purpose of the copyright statutes.”185  
Baker, Burrow-Giles, and Bobbs-Merrill together symbolize the judicial 
crystallization of the private law conception of copyright during the Classical 
era, even though they each dealt with different doctrinal questions. 
Noticeable in each opinion is the absence of any effort to locate the purposes 
of copyright in goals external to the interests of the private litigants, or in 
public-regarding (or social) policy considerations. They each take copyright’s 
structure as a private “right” seriously, proceeding to then examine the scope, 
operation, and correlatives of that right on the horizontal plane. Despite 
acknowledging the legislative origins of copyright and the role of Congress 
in enacting copyright law, the statutory basis of the regime as such is seen to 
constrain them very little in their reliance on the identification and 
explication of copyright “principles” to decide individual cases and indeed 
even understand the meaning of the statute.  
As should be obvious, much of the motivation for the private law 
conception during the Classical era drew from the Formalist belief in the 
autonomy of legal reasoning. This enabled courts to downplay the role of 
statutes and congressional motives therein, while relegating to themselves a 
more central role in the development of copyright law through a declaratory 
process. Courts saw themselves as merely declaring—rather than making—
the law by extracting principles from precedent and doctrine. With the 
decline of Legal Formalism in the 1930s—under the Legal Realists—courts 
and scholars grew to reject the idea of legal reasoning as an autonomous 
endeavor that was immune from sociopolitical considerations, and the idea 
that judges were not themselves making the law whilst declaring it.186 
Nonetheless, the private law conception of copyright endured through the era 
of Legal Realism as well. 
B. Copyright Law in the Time of Legal Realism 
Beginning in the 1920s, American legal thinking developed a noticeable 
disenchantment with Legal Formalism. The core of this pushback emanated 
from Formalism’s commitment to the autonomous nature of legal reasoning and 
its corresponding belief that adjudication was altogether immune from political 
(and other) influences.187 The Formalist cloak of legal determinacy and the 
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study of legal doctrine as “science” came to be viewed with deep suspicion, 
producing what came to be identified as the Legal Realist movement.188  
The central premise of Legal Realism was its acknowledgement that legal 
doctrine was innately indeterminate, in the sense of being unable to 
determine outcomes on its own.189 The invocation and application of doctrine 
was itself seen to be a value-laden enterprise, wherein a judge brought his or 
her individual considerations and influences to bear on the enterprise. What 
this then meant was that judges quite obviously “made” law, and did much 
more than just discover it.190 The law’s formal conceptual categories and 
abstract statements were seen as devoid of content on their own, until 
invested with actual normative ideals by decision-makers. Prominent Legal 
Realist academics included Roscoe Pound, Karl Llewelyn, Felix Cohen, 
Thurman Arnold, Leon Green, Walter Wheeler Cook, and Arthur Corbin, 
who wrote several pieces that are considered classical works of the school.191 
Beyond identifying legal doctrine to be indeterminate and 
nonautonomous in nature, the Legal Realists tended to differ in their views 
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on what normative criteria judges should and do use in arriving at decisions. 
To some, the facts of individual cases and a judge’s subjective reaction to them 
was the only realistic way of deciding cases and judges were exhorted to 
acknowledge and articulate this reality in their opinions.192 To others, general 
social facts beyond the black letter of the law provided an answer;193 and to 
yet others, ethical and moral ideals filled in the space of legal 
indeterminacy.194 At its core, then, Legal Realism was a theory about 
adjudication.195 And it focused on the creative role of the judge in making law, 
which it understood to extend beyond mechanically applying legal doctrine.  
Above all else, what made Legal Realism a particularly powerful (and 
controversial) movement at the time was that several of its protagonists were 
themselves prominent federal judges serving on the bench. Not only did these 
judges advance the core premises of the movement in their nonjudicial writing, 
but they also readily gave effect to these creeds in their actual judicial opinions. 
Prominent Legal Realist judges included Jerome Frank, Joseph Hutcheson, 
and Leon Yankwich.196 Given the wide-ranging influence of Legal Realism 
between 1920 and 1940, copyright law and jurisprudence came under its reach. 
And yet, the private law conception continued to hold sway during the Realist 
era even though it assumed a different expository character and emphasis.  
To the Legal Formalists, maintaining the distinction between private law 
and public law was crucial, given their emphasis on the autonomous and 
apolitical nature of legal reasoning, which demanded equating law with 
private law.197 In acknowledging the essentially indeterminate nature of legal 
rules and the role of politics in judging, the Realists had little to gain from 
the distinction. As historians have noted, they repudiated the rigidity of the 
distinction in many respects.198 Nevertheless, the category of “private law” 
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played an important role to the Realists, both in copyright law and beyond.199 
And this was primarily—though not perhaps exclusively—because Legal 
Realism at its heart was a theory about adjudication, which advanced the 
ideals of judicial creativity and craftsmanship in the lawmaking process as 
well as the law’s receptiveness to changing circumstances. Yet all of these 
ideals were most capable of direct instantiation only in the “common law,” 
which valorized the role of the judge and from which all of private law traced 
its provenance.200 Consequently, Realism actively embraced private law not 
because of its normative significance as a category, but instead owing to its 
common law genealogy which emphasized the judicial role. 
This explains why an early Legal Realist such as Wesley Hohfeld drew 
entirely on areas of private law in constructing his “jural relations.”201 Given 
his focus on such conceptions as employed in “judicial reasoning,” the focus 
on private law was inevitable.202 Similarly, Karl Llewellyn, considered by 
many to be the intellectual leader of the movement, exhibited a distinctive 
private law bias in all of his work.203 Some of it originated in his own focus 
as a scholar of contract law; yet it also drew in significant measure from his 
focus on the role of the judge in the “common law” appellate process, for 
which areas of private law remained indispensable.204 The connection 
between private law and the judicial function was thus a descriptive reality 
that the Realists took for granted—and which allowed for the continuation of 
the private law conception of copyright during this era. 
In drawing attention to the role of the judge in actively shaping the law, 
Legal Realism adopted the private law conception of copyright that had been 
given shape during the Classical era. Yet, it emphasized certain aspects of the 
conception over others. Much like before, it downplayed the role of the 
legislature within the system and showed scant deference to legislative intent 
and design. This was in keeping with the general disdain for the enterprise 
of statutory interpretation that some Realists had openly expressed.205 
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Instead of looking to the legislature (except when necessary206), judges 
deciding copyright cases embraced their expository role through an elaborate 
synthesis of fact and principle, and often set out to create copyright law. 
Holding true to the common law style of reasoning that this employed, 
judicial reasoning in copyright cases therefore relied heavily on precedent and 
the analytical structure of the copyright claim, which continued to emphasize 
the right-duty interaction underlying its entitlement structure. 
On the question of purpose however, the Legal Realist variant of the private 
law conception occasionally exhibited a marked ambivalence. In attempting to 
break down the public–private distinction across a range of areas, Legal Realism 
attempted to show how hitherto insular areas of legal doctrine were (and could 
be) driven by normative considerations that often extended well beyond the 
immediate context of the parties before the court; i.e., that the judicial function 
could be employed for the enterprise of social engineering.207 On occasion, this 
therefore necessitated overtly recognizing the role of public-regarding goals 
within the analysis. At the same time, the legitimacy of the judicial function, 
which Realism greatly valued, required the approach to ground itself in the 
internal, doctrine-driven purposes of an area of law. Consequently, discussions 
of copyright law (especially judicial) either avoided engaging copyright’s 
purpose and justification altogether, or on the rare occasion that it did do so, 
moved between inward- and outward-looking purposes while giving the former 
a distinctively superior position in the discussion.208  
Scholarly writing during the Realist era manifested the private law 
conception rather readily, and with few problems. Writing in 1939, Kenneth 
Umbreit, a lawyer-historian set out to answer the seemingly simple question: 
“[w]hat is a [c]opyright?”209 In answering the question, his argument attempts 
to ascertain the “nature of the property” underlying copyright.210 The 
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argument’s use of property is worthy of attention. Unlike in the Classical era 
where property was thought to have a determinate meaning and bring with it 
a set of fundamental normative consequences, during the era of Realism the 
very idea of property came under scrutiny.211 As a result of such scrutiny, the 
concept of property was itself shown to be devoid of static meaning that could 
be contextually transposed from one setting to another.212 Consequently, when 
copyright writing during this period used the word “property,” it was often as 
a mere analytical stand-in for the idea of an exclusive right, rather than a 
loaded term that carried implications drawn from real or personal property.  
Umbreit’s writing showcases the Realist use of the term “property” by 
revealing a natural restraint in having it do any normative work in the 
argument. Umbreit’s argument also highlights the Realist disdain for the 
statute, which at the time was the Copyright Act of 1909, produced as part of a 
comprehensive general revision of the law.213 He thus notes that “the statute is 
about as useful to a lawyer confronted with [copyright] questions as a copy of 
Quia Emptores is to a modern conveyancer” and that the law revealed a “judicial 
tendency” to develop the law “without awaiting statutory recognition.”214 
Perhaps the best known scholarly treatment of copyright during the 
Realist era was that of the famed First Amendment scholar Zechariah Chafee, 
Jr., a Harvard Law School professor.215 Reflecting on the need for copyright 
reform and the development of copyright principles under the 1909 Act, 
Chafee—despite being something of a public law scholar—was firm in noting 
that “[t]he primary purpose of copyright is, of course, to benefit the 
author.”216 All the same, he was under no illusion that “the very effect of 
protecting them is to make the enjoyment of their creations more costly.”217 
Consequently, the answer to him was balancing the private and public 
interest: ensuring that copyright “does not impose a burden on the public 
substantially greater than the benefit it gives to the author.”218 Here, we see 
the Realist era ambivalence towards allowing public-regarding ideals into the 
working of a private law institution; Chafee is fully content doing so, but 
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introduces a clear hierarchy wherein the individual author’s interest is treated 
as paramount and the basis of legal doctrine. 
Chafee’s writing also affirms the era’s use of property as an analytical idea 
lacking independent content. Noting that “there is no magic in words like 
‘property’ or ‘ownership’” when applied to copyright, he thus concluded that 
“[t]he scope of protection for each kind of property should depend on its 
nature and on the appropriate benefits and burdens caused by private 
ownership.”219 Characterizing copyright as property was therefore acceptable, 
but of little consequence as such. 
Ultimately, it was in courts’ jurisprudence of this era that the private law 
conception of copyright continued to hold sway. As scholars have noted, it 
was the Second Circuit during this era (rather than the Supreme Court) that 
emerged as the most important and influential court.220 Much of this was a 
consequence of the court’s composition, which comprised several prominent 
scholar-judges, many who were Legal Realists, and came to exert a lasting 
impact on the jurisprudence of the era. Prominent among the court’s judges 
at the time were Learned Hand and Jerome Frank.221 
Hand alone played a hugely influential role in the development of 
copyright law during this period. While he publicly distanced himself from 
being labelled a Legal Realist,222 his views mirrored those of his Realist 
colleagues in multiple respects. Hand’s copyright opinions were marked by a 
common law flourish and willingness to connect copyright principles to the 
facts of individual cases that made them especially noteworthy.223 While he 
often advocated a philosophy of judicial restraint in general, as scholars have 
noted, he used this as a mechanism to liberate his own legal reasoning within 
the domain that he relegated to himself.224 We see this in his copyright 
opinions no less. 
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Hand’s copyright opinions disavow reliance on any grand philosophical 
motivation in their reasoning.225 Nor do they come across as mechanistic or 
rule-driven, despite their extensive reliance on past precedent. Instead, they 
reveal an acute engagement with the factual record and the nature of the work 
seeking protection.226 In then relying on precedent and principle to fashion a 
rule of application to the facts, Hand’s exposition adopted a declaratory and 
prophetic tone that marked his confidence with the subject. His opinion in 
the oft-cited case of Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. illustrates this.227 After 
setting out the facts of the case and analyzing prior precedent on the 
infringement analysis to distill a rule,228 the opinion goes out of its way to 
make a variety of observations that have since then stood the test of time: the 
“abstractions” formulation,229 the notion that “nobody ever can” fix the 
boundary between idea and expression,230 and perhaps most importantly that 
even though judicial line-drawing on the issue may seem “arbitrary,” courts 
should not shy away from the issue.231 A similar pattern is to be seen in several 
of his other leading copyright opinions.232 Indeed, a hallmark of Hand’s 
jurisprudence in the copyright realm appears to be his express willingness to 
treat copyright’s “principles” as being independent of the formal origin of the 
law itself, i.e., whether statutory or common law. In one case, he would thus 
observe that “[c]opyright in any form, whether statutory or at common-law, 
is a monopoly; it consists only in the power to prevent others from 
reproducing the copyrighted work.”233 All the same, there were occasions 
when Hand’s ideal of judicial restraint came through, especially when 
expressly called upon (by a party) to make law in an area altogether devoid of 
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precedent.234 Copyright principles were thus, first and foremost to Hand, 
principles embedded in the positive law of the time. 
Hand’s more openly Realist-leaning contemporaries on the Second 
Circuit, such as Frank, were significantly less informed about copyright law 
and doctrine than Hand was, a reality that comes across in their decisions. 
Nonetheless, taking their cue from Hand, their opinions too adopted the 
same general pattern as Hand’s did. Heavily fact-dependent and driven by 
the search for copyright principles, they reveal a willingness to embrace 
judicial lawmaking in the domain with little deference to the legislature or to 
an implicit legislative design. Frank’s majority opinion in Arnstein v. Porter 
epitomizes this tendency.235 Developing the law from first principles, the case 
does not so much as reference the copyright statute above-the-line even once, 
and instead gives it an overtly transsubstantive dimension.236 The only 
allusion to copyright’s purpose is to be found in one sentence in the opinion, 
where he notes that the plaintiff ’s “legally protected interest” is not a 
reputation-driven one, but instead the “potential financial returns” from the 
work.237 Interestingly, Frank derives this proposition from prior case law, and 
at the end of a string of judicial precedent introduces a citation to a few 
provisions of the Copyright Act, revealing its use of the word “profit.”238 
Frank’s opinion in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts exhibits the same 
trend.239 Drawing on his own conception of the creative process, Frank 
develops the rule that unintentional—and purely fortuitous—variations 
could constitute original contributions that render a work copyrightable.240 
Frank’s rationale for this innovation is seemingly driven entirely by first 
principles with no reference whatsoever to the statute or legislative intent, 
nor indeed to any conception of copyright’s purposes.241  
The Realist variant of the private law conception was hardly limited to the 
Second Circuit. Cain v. Universal Pictures Co. exemplifies its broader reach.242 In 
that case, Judge Leon Yankwich coined the notion of “scènes à faire” stock 
elements used by all creators working within a genre, and which were 
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unprotectable components of the work.243 In so doing, the opinion placed 
reliance entirely on related precedent and copyright “principles.”244 In reflecting 
on his work as a judge many years after the decision in Cain, Yankwich identified 
“creative judging” as an important hallmark of the judicial enterprise, wherein 
“judges apply and adapt to [new conditions] old precepts and principles,” 
thereby producing “new law” through “adjudication” that reveals judges’ views 
on the “social needs” of the time.245 In later work, he even echoed Hand’s 
understanding that copyright was the “right of printing or multiplying copies of 
an original work	.	.	.	to the exclusion of others.”246 Yankwich’s thinking 
internalized the dominant Realist credo, as refracted through the constraints of 
the judicial process and copyright law. In Cain—and in Yankwich’s thinking and 
writing—we once again see the private law conception at play: an emphasis on 
copyright’s horizontal structure, a downplaying of legislative guidance, the 
derivation of copyright logic, purpose, and principle from within its functioning, 
and an overt affirmation of the judicial role in expounding copyright principle 
and developing copyright doctrine. 
To be sure, the generic Realist disaffection for the private law/public law 
distinction had the effect of diluting the private law conception of copyright 
over time and introduced important cracks in its foundations. If legal 
reasoning was not autonomous and indeed took color from social, economic, 
and political considerations, what reason was there to continue to look within 
copyright doctrine and principles to shape the course of the law? If outward-
facing considerations were relevant to copyright, why did judges need to have 
a monopoly over the exposition and development of copyright doctrine? And 
if considerations beyond those embodied in the formal sources of law became 
fair game in the development of copyright law, would not this render 
copyright law rampantly indeterminate and subject it to the whims of an 
unelected judiciary? Embodied within the Realist variant of the private law 
conception were therefore important analytical contradictions, most of which 
had been successfully cabined off by the courts themselves in order to allow 
the system to flourish. It was therefore but a matter of time before this 
equilibrium was unsettled and the approach unraveled. 
* * * 
The private law conception of copyright thus thrived in the period between 
1860 and 1940, and was characterized by an emphasis on the horizontal, 
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principle-based, and common law-oriented aspects of the regime. The purpose 
of copyright was rooted in the justification for the author’s rights in the 
creative work and the copier’s correlative wrongdoing, both of which almost 
always assumed an individualist dimension. While copyright jurisprudence 
retained this general orientation under the Legal Realists, Legal Realism 
nonetheless posed a real challenge to the narrowly analytical focus of the 
private law conception, which exalted judicial lawmaking while simultaneously 
confirming the indeterminacy of law and legal reasoning. What was needed 
was an approach that could address the challenge of indeterminacy posed by 
Realism, while simultaneously retaining its claim to democratic legitimacy and 
the integrity of law and the legal method. Enter the Legal Process.  
III. THE LEGAL PROCESS TURN IN COPYRIGHT 
Even though the private law conception of copyright continued to 
dominate through the 1940s, the central insights of Legal Realism had put 
serious cracks in its foundations. Above all else, its reliance on the conceptual 
architecture of the entitlement for its normative ideals and purposes seemed 
largely misplaced. While the juricentric focus of Realism had enabled the 
survival of the private law conception, it was only a matter of time before that 
last thread was severed. 
In drawing attention to the myth of doctrinal determinacy, as well as the 
necessarily political nature of judicial decisionmaking, Legal Realism had 
succeeded in debunking the Formalist belief in the autonomous nature of legal 
reasoning.247 All the same, it failed to offer a sufficiently coherent alternative 
in its place. If legal reasoning and adjudication were as indeterminate and 
unpredictable as they claimed, the legal system appeared indelibly irrational. 
The system’s commitment to the rule of law would then be little more than a 
farce.248 While the Realists might have been willing to maintain this position 
as an academic matter, the events of the Second World War—and the birth of 
totalitarianism around the world—made their commitment to skepticism 
altogether unpalatable, especially as a prescriptive matter.249 
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Following the war, the Realists distanced themselves from their 
commitment to the prediction-theory of the law.250 Llewellyn thus openly 
retracted his statement that the law was nothing more than official action 
devoid of ethical content and claimed to do “open penance” for pushing the 
skeptical agenda.251 The juricentrism of Realist thinking therefore came under 
direct attack, especially insofar as it was associated with the school’s theory of 
law. Llewellyn himself conceded that appellate court decisionmaking faced a 
“crisis of confidence” and was viewed with extreme “cynicism” during any 
effort to discern the law.252 
Ironically, juricentrism also came under direct attack within copyright law 
circles, but for seemingly unrelated reasons. With technological 
developments having rendered several aspects of the Copyright Act of 1909 
obsolete and in serious need of updating, courts had come to play a major role 
in keeping the system afloat—through their development of the law in 
common law fashion.253 And as with other areas of the common law, this 
approach had generated its own fault lines including conflicting and 
inconsistent decisions, circuit splits, frequent changes, and judge-made rules 
that contradicted the text of the statute.254 This brought the role of courts 
within the copyright system into disrepute, with some describing the 
judiciary’s attempted upkeep of the regime as “ridiculous” and “chaotic.”255 
There is little evidence that the problems identified with the judge-made 
copyright law of the time were any greater—or indeed of any greater 
significance—than similar problems long understood as a byproduct of judge-
made law and the common law process more generally.256 The system-wide 
concern with rule indeterminacy and unbounded discretion, which assumed 
a level of “frenz[y]” and “intensity” because of the war, appears to have 
coalesced with the call for copyright reform that had begun even before the 
war.257 The ideals of certainty, accountability, and democratic legitimacy had 
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assumed new meaning after the war, and copyright law/reform got swept up 
by their obvious allure. With American legal thinking shedding its affinity for 
juricentrism, conceptualism, and skeptical positivism, the time was ripe for a 
fundamentally different approach to legal reasoning and analysis; one that 
emphasized the centrality of the rule of law by giving it functional content, 
and at the same time attempted to realize a democratic consensus in the 
creation and application of legal rules. Moving lawmaking away from courts 
and towards the other more representative branches of government emerged 
as an obvious direction—both within copyright law and beyond. Thus 
emerged the Legal Process turn in American thinking. 
A. Legal Process Theory 
The intellectual roots of this move took shape at the Harvard Law School. 
Just before the war, then law professor Felix Frankfurter began to advocate a 
move away from the school’s focus on common law-based private law subjects, 
and towards a greater understanding of “administrative law,” which he saw as 
crucial to understanding the modern administrative state that had emerged 
following the New Deal.258 “[A]dministrative solutions to social problems” 
formed a recurrent theme in his writing.259 When he took his position on the 
Supreme Court, his judicial opinions in the decades after revealed a similar 
emphasis, including an application of his insistence on “judicial self-restraint” 
and judicial “humility.”260 Even after his departure from the Harvard law faculty, 
Frankfurter’s views continued to hold sway on his colleagues, and scholars have 
noted how leading into the 1950s, he was “God” to many of them.261 His 
influence on three such colleagues produced the Legal Process School. 
The first was Lon Fuller, a legal theorist and scholar of contract law.262 
While initially a Legal Realist, Fuller had grown disenchanted with the 
movement and become an outspoken critic of the school’s skeptical ideas. This 
anti-skepticism coalesced with his well-known attack on legal positivism, 
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resulting in the famous Hart-Fuller debate.263 Fuller’s work emphasized the 
law’s intrinsic connection between the “is” and the “ought” and maintained 
that “reason” was the ultimate methodology of law, which give it its ethical 
component.264 And it was adjudication that gave “formal and institutional 
expression to the influence of reasoned argument in human affairs” but at the 
same time had its own limits insofar as there were questions unsuited to 
adjudicative disposition and better “left to the legislature.”265  
Frankfurter’s two other fellow travelers were Albert Sacks, his former law 
clerk, and Henry Hart, the intellectual leader of the Harvard Law faculty at 
the time.266 Fuller, Hart, and Sacks formed a “mutual admiration society” and 
built on each other’s ideas and writings.267 Beginning in the 1950s, Hart and 
Sacks assembled a set of teaching materials for their class, which they titled 
“The Legal Process.” In it, they provide an elaborate account of their 
approach to law. While acknowledging the Realist insight that legal doctrine 
was on its own incapable of cabining discretion, they nonetheless sought to 
argue that legal discretion could be channeled through “institutionalized .	.	. 
arrangements” that distributed the lawmaking function among different legal 
actors.268 Whereas Fuller had constructed his argument in largely 
theoretical/abstract terms, Hart and Sacks developed their theory through a 
set of problems. In The Legal Process, which became the classical work of the 
Legal Process School, they thus effectively developed a systematic account of 
what law was, one that connected the actual content of legal rules 
(“substantive” arrangements) to the method and process through which they 
were generated and accepted (“procedural” arrangements).269 Much has been 
written about the theory of law advanced by the Legal Process School.270 All 
the same, to appreciate its significance for the transformation of copyright 
law, three aspects of the theory are worthy of elucidation.  
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1. The (Collective) Instrumentalism of Law 
Fundamental to Legal Process thinking was the recognition that law was 
an intrinsically instrumental or purposive enterprise that does not exist for its 
own sake. While Hart and Sacks gave this version of instrumentalism its 
functional content, the idea finds its origins in the work of Fuller, who 
maintained that any attempt to neatly separate out the “is” and the “ought” in 
the law was a futile exercise.271 Analogizing legal reasoning to the process of 
retelling a story, Fuller argued that a “statute or decision is not a segment of 
being, but [is]	.	.	.	a process of becoming.”272 Through the process of reasoned 
interpretation, “it becomes	.	.	.	something that it was not originally.”273 Laws 
therefore embody both “words” and “an objective sought,” and the two go hand 
in hand in the very idea of law, a premise that positivism stridently rejected.274 
Fuller’s theoretical observations formed the premise of the Hart-Sacks 
formulation of law, seen in The Legal Process. To them, 
Law is a doing of something, a purposive activity, a continuous striving to 
solve the basic problems of social living .	.	.	. Legal arrangements (laws) are 
provisions for the future in aid of this effort. Sane people do not make provisions 
for the future which are purposeless. It can be accepted as a fixed premise, 
therefore, that every statute and every doctrine of unwritten law developed by 
the decisional process has some kind of purpose or objective	.	.	.	.275 
In identifying the ultimate purpose of law as inhering in the realities of 
social living, Hart and Sacks readily subscribed to a collectivist vision. Early 
on in their book, they give the idea more direct expression and note that it 
remains an undeniable reality of “human existence” that human beings live 
“under	.	.	.	conditions of interdependence,” which generates a “common 
interest.”276 Laws—i.e., legal arrangements—arise because of this common 
enterprise, with the overarching purpose of fostering interdependence.277 
Hart and Sacks thus gave the inherent purposiveness of law an avowedly 
collectivist orientation in their framing. Yet this was not because of their belief 
in any form of simple utilitarianism, a reading of their theory that is far too 
simplistic.278 It was instead because of their attempt to connect “arrangements” 
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to legal institutions and the mechanisms that such institutions employed.279 
The essence of law was thus the “institutionaliz[ation] [of] procedures for the 
settlement of questions of group concern.”280 Law was collectivist problem 
solving, which made it a process rather than a static result. As Charles Barzun 
has argued, the overarching orientation of this account was therefore 
pragmatic, rather than utilitarian.281 
The instrumental orientation of law achieved two things at once. First, it 
distanced the account from the idea of law as an autonomous enterprise, 
which embodied its own normative premises. And second, it infused the law 
with a plausible ethical component, one that was rooted in the collectivism 
inherent in a functional democracy. In so doing, it distinguished itself from 
the skeptical project of Legal Realism and gave the idea of law a functioning 
set of normative commitments, all of which were rooted in the idea of 
“arrangements” for “group” living.282 
At its core then, the instrumentalism of law that the Legal Process School 
emphasized was an institutional instrumentalism. This institutional turn was 
an inflection that it introduced in order to reiterate the existence of an ethical 
content for law, which it readily located within the paradigm of American 
democracy. Since institutions epitomized the ideal of democratic legitimacy, 
the institutional turn necessarily embodied a majoritarian emphasis. And by 
rooting the purpose of law in the maintenance of conditions for collective (or 
group) living, the theory implicitly seemed to prioritize collective ideals—
enshrined in its institutional vision—over individual ones. 
It bears emphasizing that the collectivism of the Hart-Sacks conception 
of law was in the end an abstract one, in that it focused on the ultimate aims 
of law and legal arrangements rather than on individual decisions and 
doctrines. Yet, it was to inform and guide all decisions, even at lower levels, 
and even if only indirectly.283 Inconspicuous as it may have seemed, it 
performed an important framing role for legal analysis and reasoning. 
2. Institutional Settlement and the Primacy of Legislation 
Closely related to the instrumental orientation of law in the Legal Process 
account was its core idea—“institutional settlement.”284 Described by Hart 
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and Sacks as the “central idea of law,” institutional settlement stood for the 
principle that decisions arrived at through “duly established procedures” were 
to be accepted as “binding” on all of society, until those procedures 
themselves were changed.285 The intrinsic democratic legitimacy of the 
institutional arrangements created by the legal order (and the Constitution) 
required accepting the substantive outcomes of those arrangements. The 
overriding motivation for this framework was fairly apparent: it sought to 
root the substantive legitimacy of the law in the institutional framework 
through which it was generated. 
Institutional settlement was also the mechanism that the Legal Process 
School employed to give effect to its conflation of the “is” and the “ought.” 
Whether something is the law on a point was seen as primarily a product of 
whether it was generated by the institutional framework and body that ought 
to be tasked with its creation. In so doing, institutional settlement gave the 
notion of separation of powers real significance in determining the 
substantive content of the law. 
Determining whether a question is “settled” by an institution therefore 
begins with an account of what kinds of questions are appropriately within the 
domain of each institution—in different substantive areas of law.286 And it is 
here that the Legal Process School developed a coherent normative framework. 
Even though they recognized the importance of “decisional law” within the 
legal system, Hart and Sacks noted a fundamental difference between the forms 
of lawmaking that courts and legislatures could engage in.287 At the top of the 
hierarchy, and vested with peremptory authority, was the legislature: 
In the American legal system final responsibility for making such changes [in 
the body of working arrangements] is entrusted to the legislature, subject to 
such limits as the governing constitution places upon the legislature’s powers 
and subject also to the extraordinary procedure of constitutional amendment. 
The function is inherently discretionary. For the number of potential changes 
that can be made in existing arrangements is infinite, and choice among the 
infinity of possibilities can never be controlled by any “scientific” test.	  
Discretion also must include whether to legislate or not to 
legislate	.	.	.	.	In the field of arrangements governing private activity, every 
American legislature possesses and constantly exercises this vitally significant 
discretion whether to legislate at all. 
In the exercise of this discretion	.	.	.	legislatures	make .	.	.	changes in the 
grounds of decision that courts are directed to employ—of changes, in other 
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words, in the content of self-applying regulatory arrangements.	.	.	. In 
making changes of [this] type, the legislature reviews the soundness for the 
future of the specific judgments of policy embodied in the ground of decision 
it replaces. The changes it decides upon will in many, if not all, cases be 
changes which it would have been within the power of a court to introduce 
in the first instance. In this sphere	.	.	.	court and legislature are in some sense 
in competition, with the legislature having the last word for the future.288  
Courts were to play an important role within the system, principally as 
problem solvers. In so doing, courts engaged in a task that the Legal Process 
School identified as “reasoned elaboration.”289 Reasoned elaboration was 
intricately connected to the idea that laws—of all kinds—embodied a “policy” 
or objective/purpose and were based on an admonition to courts to situate 
their decisionmaking around the identification and clarification of the law’s 
purposes.290 Purposes were seen to abound in different parts of the legal 
system (owing to law’s intrinsic purposiveness), and the courts’ job was to 
“rationaliz[e]” these purposes, recognizing there to be an obvious hierarchy 
between the specific and more general ones.291 With decisional law, the body 
of court-made law, courts were free to utilize a variety of sources and 
principles to elaborate on the purpose of the law at hand. But with areas of 
law defined by statutes, Hart and Sacks were clear that courts should not see 
themselves as being “in the same position as a legislator” but instead “respect 
the position of the legislature in the institutional system.”292 
Thus, in domains where Congress had acted—statutorily—Congress was to 
be regarded as the primary determinant of the law’s policy (or objectives), which 
courts were to glean from the terms of the statute as well as its context, and then 
elaborate on when needed. In other words, the “policy” of the law for a statutory 
regime was the ultimate responsibility of Congress, which courts could do little 
to question, negate, or override.293 This was an idea first enunciated by Roscoe 
Pound, and later further developed by Felix Frankfurter.294 Statutes—on their 
own—could serve as freestanding sources of both law and legal reasoning, and 
thus embody a distinctive policy within their four corners. 
On the face of things, this may have appeared to resuscitate the positivist 
divide between the “is” and the “ought,” especially insofar as it appeared to 
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require courts to focus entirely on stating the law as it is. This is where the 
idea of reasoned elaboration assumed significance, to collapse the is/ought 
divide by giving courts a good amount of—but nonetheless bounded—leeway 
in developing the purposes of the law.295 In requiring courts to deploy their 
powers of reason and persuasion in deciding cases and in interpreting the law, 
the Legal Process School has been understood as implicitly affirming a 
purposivist or “dynamic” approach to interpretation.296 While courts were 
thus subservient to the legislature in determining a statute’s policy, they 
nonetheless had a responsibility to elaborate on it, and then show a 
connection between their decisionmaking in an individual case and the 
statutory policy at issue. While courts could thus elaborate on the policy once 
created by the statute, this subsidiarity was critical; or, as Frankfurter put it, 
judges were to develop a “trained[] reluctance” to cross the line from 
adjudication to legislation.297 
The extent of subsidiarity was of course not constant. In situations where 
the legislature has itself delegated policymaking to courts (e.g., “common law 
statutes”298), the deference was to be fairly minimal. But in comprehensive 
statutory regimes, courts were to glean the policy from the text and context. 
“[W]here policy is expressed by the	.	.	.	legislature, judges must respect such 
expressions by adding to or subtracting from the explicit terms which the 
lawmakers use no more than is called for by the shorthand nature of 
language.”299 The law’s purposes (or policy) were thus embedded within the 
terms of the statute, which the legislature alone had the ability to dictate and 
change; courts were to elaborate and interpret this policy with due deference.300 
Related to the primacy of the legislature (and of statutes) was the role 
that the Legal Process theory accorded to administrative expertise. While 
Hart and Sacks only dealt with the question in passing,301 they nonetheless 
observed the importance of having the legislature delegate its lawmaking 
“discretion” to administrative agencies in different domains in order to 
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enhance the “effectiveness” of the regime.302 Courts were meant to follow 
administrative action using the same general framework of institutional 
settlement, depending on the precise kind of question being addressed by the 
agency. Later scholars have applied the Legal Process framework in even 
more detail to administrative regulation, arguing that its ideas about reasoned 
elaboration, purposive interpretation, and deference to expertise carry over 
to the realm of administrative agencies with few problems.303  
3. The Structured Collapse of the Private Law/Public Law Distinction 
A third, and hitherto underappreciated move that the Legal Process 
School deployed is of direct relevance to our discussion of copyright law. This 
was its conscious–analytical conflation of public law and private law through 
its theory of law and its idea of institutional settlement. While some aspects 
of this move were implicit in the working of the theory, other aspects were 
deliberate extensions of its central ideas. The traditional (and standard) 
understanding of private law focused on analyzing a substantive area through 
the horizontal relationship between the parties to a dispute, using the ideas 
of right and duty. Social considerations of a collectivist nature—that would 
extend beyond the immediate context of the claimants—were treated as 
distinctively secondary in this understanding. 
The theory’s attempt to dilute the primacy of juricentrism, discussed 
previously,304 formed its implicit move in this direction. Since historically 
most areas of private law were also common law subjects that were developed 
substantively by courts, the dismantling of juricentrism naturally moved the 
theory’s construction of “law” away from a private law orientation that 
emphasized the parties’ claims (horizontal in nature) as the primary basis for 
lawmaking in the area. Additionally, insofar as courts—even in state 
jurisdictions—could be overridden by legislatures on questions of social 
policy, the common law (in both substance and in method) ceased to represent 
the core ideal of what a well-functioning legal system represented in the Legal 
Process account.305 
The theory’s more overt conflation of private law and public law was 
systematic, and a consequence of its institutional focus. Recall that for Hart 
and Sacks, the idea of “policy” was synonymous with the purposes and 
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objectives of a regime.306 And since the ultimate purpose of any legal 
arrangement was its furtherance of “group” living or collectivism, the very idea 
of policy readily partook of a public orientation.307 Policy, in other words, was 
principally a stand-in for notions of “social engineering” that sociological 
jurisprudence had made famous.308 Insofar as legislatures held primary 
responsibility for questions of collectivist social policy, and statutes were seen 
as embodiments of such policy when brought into existence, statutory regimes 
were presumptively, to Hart and Sacks, public-regarding in their orientation. 
Statutes had purposes—or policy goals—which emanated from the 
legislature’s attempt to develop arrangements to govern interactions between 
individuals in the future.309 Since the legislature was by definition a 
collectivist institution presumptively representative of diverse segments of 
society, its focus was meant to be on public goals. Consequently, every 
legislative intervention was in effect a manifestation of public goals, quite 
regardless of the individual subject area at issue. It is crucial to note that this 
was hardly just a serendipitous consequence of the Legal Process theory’s 
other precepts. It emerged instead from a fairly conscious realization (on the 
part of Hart and Sacks) that all conflicts—even when private—had important 
spillover effects for the public that required collective management. One 
scholar thus analyzes their impetus in the following terms: 
[A]s scholars whose primary focus was private law, Hart and Sacks were well 
aware of both the ubiquity of conflict and the diversity of interests in human 
affairs. They understood that law must accommodate the often competing 
interests of producers, distributors, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers, taking 
account of the parallel competition among federal, state, and local regulators 
acting through legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial channels.310  
Private (law) conflicts were thus more than just the concern of the private 
parties involved in it. Such conflicts needed to be proactively managed and, 
as far as possible, avoided. To this end, collective solutions that were 
legislatively (or administratively) developed allowed for such management. 
Insofar as legislation represented a collective solution produced through a 
public process, and indelibly derivative of social concerns, statutes came to be 
understood within the Legal Process account as the subject of “public law.”311 
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In equating statutes and legislation with public law, Legal Process theory 
therefore consciously underemphasized the traditional divisions of law that 
had predated its advent. While Hart and Sacks were themselves less explicit 
about this move, later scholars writing in the tradition have emphasized how 
the theory laid the ground work for a “public values” based approach to the 
construction and interpretation of statutes.312 It is important to appreciate 
the far-reaching significance of this move: any legislative intervention 
(statute) in an area of law traditionally considered “private law” was now quite 
legitimately infused with public/collectivist considerations.313 
Legal Process theory is credited with having created the modern “public 
law” curriculum that is today the mainstay of American legal education.314 It 
achieved this result by emphasizing the transsubstantive nature of its precepts 
and arguments, and by downplaying the significance and normativity of the 
law’s traditional divisions. In focusing on the arrangements of law and its 
“administration,” Legal Process underplayed the role of substantive rules in 
individual areas and avoided specification of the discrete normative values 
that influenced them. The divide between private law and public law areas, 
which had until then been a mainstay of American (and indeed most common 
law) thinking, fell victim to this move. 
As a prime example of this move within Legal Process thinking, consider 
the very first problem that Hart and Sacks use to illustrate the functioning of 
their theory in The Legal Process: “The Case of the Spoiled Cantaloupes.”315 
On its face, the problem is a simple contractual one relating to the sale and 
shipment of cantaloupes from a wholesaler to a distributor, who discovers 
them to be decaying upon arrival.316 The dispute proceeds to litigation—
which is private in nature, being about contractual performance.317 In their 
exposition of the problem, Hart and Sacks first set out information about the 
agreement and then information relating to the nature of the American 
industry involving the trade of fruits and vegetables.318 They later move to 
describing the federal regulations issued by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture concerning the different grades of fruits, and the influence of this 
gradation on the practices and norms among merchants.319 
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What converts the dispute from an ordinary breach of contract lawsuit into 
a more complex case is the presence of a special enactment known as the 
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (“PACA”), which authorizes the 
Department of Agriculture to regulate the sales of fresh and frozen fruits and 
vegetables to ensure against unfair practices.320 In addition to authorizing the 
issuance of regulations, the PACA also creates a special dispute resolution 
mechanism that allows for the adjudication of private disputes without a 
formal civil complaint.321 In their problem, Hart and Sacks therefore have one 
party commence a proceeding under the PACA when the nonperformance 
occurs.322 The adjudication results in a finding for the respondent, who then 
promptly appeals the matter to the district court, which then relies on standard 
contract law principles to find for the petitioner, concluding that the implied 
warranties of quality and description were breached.323 On appeal to the First 
Circuit, the court vacates the district court decision, concluding—as a matter 
of simple contract law—that the contract had no right of rejection, despite the 
warranty being breached, but that damages could be claimed.324 
Yet the matter does not end there. The Department of Agriculture files a 
petition for rehearing with the First Circuit, seeking a reconsideration, 
claiming that its interpretation of the relevant administrative regulation—
under the PACA—covered the dispute and was owed due deference under 
principles of administrative law.325 The court relents and issues an amended 
opinion, this time deferring to the Department’s interpretation since it was 
not “plainly erroneous,” despite conceding that it might have chosen to 
interpret and apply the Act differently.326 
All of the decisions that the problem represents are actual cases decided by 
courts. Hart and Sacks use the problem to illustrate the working of institutional 
settlement and the idea that legislative and administrative guidance should 
override judicial discretion in many situations, even where a court thinks that its 
own judgment would be substantively better than the one actually reached by 
another institution.327 Lurking underneath the institutional settlement, however, 
is a subtle and underemphasized conversion of the dispute from one about private 
law to one about public law, a move that the Legal Process account celebrates. 
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The existence of a legislative intervention in the area produces a 
comingling of private contract law concerns and broader institutional/social 
ones in the case. This in turn forces the appellate court to consider not just 
the parties’ interests and claims, but also the broader (social) implications of 
its holding. Whereas the administrative tribunal and the district court both 
treat the problem as one of contract interpretation and breach, the appellate 
court adopts an interpretive rule that “[w]hen terms which have been given a 
definite meaning under [a statute] are used	.	.	.	in transactions governed by 
the [statute], it can not later be maintained that a different meaning was 
intended.”328 Legislative intention therefore overrides any presumptive 
contractual intention. On reconsideration, the appellate court then makes an 
all-important structural move. It affirms the primacy of the “policy” 
underlying the statute (that is, the PACA) over not just its own ruling and 
interpretation of the law, but also the basic ideals of contract law and the 
autonomy of the parties that had specifically contracted in the case.329 The 
court thus agrees with the executive’s (i.e., the United States’s) position that 
“buyers would not be discouraged from rejecting” if they are able to obtain 
damages and reverses itself, apparently agreeing that the policy of 
discouraging wrongful rejections was paramount.330 Regulating the collective 
behavior of all parties (that is, all future buyers) thus overtly overrides a 
contractual rule that the court otherwise saw as sound and as being in step 
with basic, established contract law principles. Implicit in the supremacy of 
the legislature and executive over the judiciary here is the primacy of the 
collectivist policy over individual/private contract law principles. 
Hart and Sacks’ first problem merely highlights a recurring, but hitherto 
unacknowledged, impulse in The Legal Process, which is to develop public law 
solutions—driven by institutional considerations and collectivist normative 
motivations—to private law problems and disputes. And in the process, the 
theory dismantled the traditional divide between private law and public law.  
B. Remaking American Copyright Law 
As noted previously, the private law conception of copyright continued to 
hold sway through the Legal Realist era, principally owing to its emphasis on 
juricentrism, even when unconstrained. The era of Legal Realism coincided 
with the New Deal, the extensive economic relief and regulatory legislation 
passed by the Roosevelt Administration as a response to the Great 
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Depression.331 While scholars have debated the intellectual cross-currents 
between Legal Realism and New Deal thinking, the latter undoubtedly took 
the focus of law and legal reasoning in the direction of public law and 
administration. Indeed, some have even argued that the emergence of New 
Deal legislation during the period itself played a role in diluting Legal 
Realism’s reliance on juricentrism.332  
Leaving aside this independent cross-fertilization, the New Deal agenda 
seems to have had little direct impact on domestic copyright thinking as such, 
other than delaying its reform. The dawn of World War II also contributed 
to this. In the period between 1925 and 1940, debates about copyright reform 
focused on ensuring that U.S. copyright law conformed to the international 
copyright system, manifested in the Berne Convention.333 The war and its 
aftermath—among other reasons—resulted in an abandonment of these 
efforts, with the U.S. eventually deciding not to join Berne.334 Following this 
decision, the U.S. decided to propose its own alternative international 
copyright regime, the “Universal Copyright Convention,” which produced 
minimal changes to domestic copyright law.335 Thus, by 1955, U.S. copyright 
lawmakers had made a self-conscious decision to allow domestic copyright 
law to remain sui generis in the international landscape. 
The heyday of Legal Process theory was the 1950s, a period during which 
post-New Deal thinking coalesced with the perceived need for a new account 
of law (and legal institutions). It was also during this very period that the 
growing call for domestic-focused copyright reform finally met with success, 
when in 1955, Congress authorized the Copyright Office to initiate a 
“program of research and studies” leading to a “general revision” of domestic 
copyright law.336 The impetus for this delegation to the Copyright Office 
appears to have been twofold: one, the perception that the Copyright Office 
was indeed the body with the requisite expertise on the subject; and two, the 
unique structure of the Office as a branch of the Library of Congress, which 
ensured direct congressional oversight over the process.337 Over the next 
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three years, the Office produced thirty-four studies on different aspects of 
U.S. copyright law.338 What is important to note in this revision is that the 
Office selected not just areas that had been hitherto legislated upon, but, in 
addition, areas of copyright law that had until then been entirely the creation 
of courts.339 Between 1958 and 1974, Congress (and the Copyright Office) 
held a series of meetings and consultations, which in turn produced myriad 
compromises that allowed the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976.  
The legislative history leading up to the Act certainly does not reveal an 
express reliance on the Legal Process framework of thinking. Yet, as scholars 
have noted, the influence of Legal Process theory—in its Hart-Sacks 
formulation—was at once pervasive and indirect.340 Its intellectual influence 
emerged through multiple indirect channels. Law students, who would go on 
to clerk for prominent federal judges and Supreme Court justices, were 
trained on the Hart-Sacks materials and cognate texts that incorporated 
several of its basic ideas.341 Several prominent Supreme Court justices were 
not just aware of the framework, but openly subscribed to its ideas.342 With 
courts and judges openly channeling the theory’s basic precepts, especially 
the “tripartite structure of government” and the “authority of administrative 
agencies” in specialized domains, the influence of the theory was therefore 
mostly indirect but intellectually powerful—representing a shift in mindset, 
rather than a direct application.343 Indeed, few legal theories see their 
influence ever realized directly, and so it is with Legal Process and copyright. 
This perhaps also explains why the academic decline of Legal Process 
thinking in 1960s did little to stymie its influence as a model of lawmaking 
and reasoning among courts and policymakers. 
The best evidence of the Legal Process theory’s influence on copyright 
thinking is seen in the legal regime that eventually emerged from the 
comprehensive revision process, which reveals a direct instantiation of the 
theory’s central insights. In examining this revelation, two preliminary 
observations are worthy of note here.  
 
338 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 1961 REPORT, supra note 33, at x-xi. 
339 See, e.g., GEORGE D. CARY, STUDY NO. 12: JOINT OWNERSHIP OF COPYRIGHTS (1958); 
ABRAHAM L. KAMINSTEIN, STUDY NO. 11: DIVISIBILITY OF COPYRIGHTS (1957); ALAN LATMAN, 
STUDY NO. 14: FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1958). 
340 See Eskridge & Frickey, Making, supra note 17, at 2047-48 (noting the prevalence of the 
Hart-Sacks formulation in the legal academy).  
341 Id. at 2046-47. 
342 Id.; see also Philip P. Frickey, Avoiding Constitutional Questions in the Early Warren Court: 
Judicial Craftsmanship and Statutory Interpretation, in EARL WARREN AND THE WARREN COURT: 
THE LEGACY IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN LAW 209, 213-14 (Harry N. Schreiber ed., 2007); 
Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at civ.  
343 Wiecek, supra note 248, at 870. 
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First, the new “regime” that emerged was much more than just the text of 
the statute. It instead encompassed a complete shift in mindset, encapsulated 
not just in congressional intervention (i.e., the statute) but also in 
corresponding changes in the approaches of the federal judiciary and 
administrative agencies on questions of copyright. Indeed, their interaction 
and coordination formed a central part of the theory’s core. Consequently, the 
transformation that occurred was not purely a post-1976 one, but instead one 
that began to take shape in the 1950s and 1960s as well, and which coalesced 
with the eventual text of the legislation that emerged in 1976. Indeed, the seeds 
of this change are to be seen in some of Justice Frankfurter’s opinions on 
copyright law. In one opinion delivered during the war, he thus openly 
advanced a new account of what courts should be doing in copyright cases: 
It is not for courts to judge whether the interests of authors clearly lie 
upon one side of this question rather than the other.	.	.	.	We do not have such 
assured knowledge about authorship, and particularly about song writing, or 
the psychology of gifted writers and composers, as to justify us as judges in 
importing into Congressional legislation a denial to authors of the freedom 
to dispose of their property possessed by others.344	 
The shift therefore had begun well before the passage of the 1976 Act, 
which merely cemented it. 
Second, as a causal explanation it is very plausible that the central tenets 
of Legal Process theory that were developed by Hart and Sacks (and Fuller) 
were themselves representations of a changing landscape, which had begun 
to emerge around them. In other words, insofar as much of their theory was 
plausibly descriptive (rather than prescriptive) of the contemporary legal 
system of the time (a reality reflected in the fact that many of their 
hypotheticals were actual legal cases and problems), the dramatic change that 
came to be seen in the copyright regime was hardly a direct effect of the 
theory in isolation, and more the product of changes in overall legal thinking 
that Legal Process theory merely captured and distilled. This latter insight 
certainly does not in any way diminish the influence of Legal Process theory 
on copyright. It merely suggests that such influence may have been 
explanatory and justificatory, rather than purely causal. 
1. The Triumph of Copyright Collectivism 
The copyright regime that emerged following World War II represented 
a clear triumph for collectivist ideals. Beginning in the 1950s, after a full 
century and a half of U.S. copyright law having been in existence, federal 
 
344 Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 657 (1943). 
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courts deciding copyright cases began to speak of a “copyright policy” for the 
first time, a trend that continues to this day.345 This is far from being a mere 
coincidence, given how commonplace the phrase eventually became 
thereafter and its complete absence from copyright jurisprudence until then. 
Indeed, what is worth emphasizing is that nothing significant had changed as 
such in the content of the copyright statute (or in related jurisprudence) from 
the prior era to this one, rendering the sudden onset of this usage intriguing.  
A closer analysis of courts’ use of the idea reveals a few additional details 
about their reasons for doing so. First, it came to be used as a stand-in for the 
purposes and objects underlying the copyright statute.346 In other words, 
statutory policy and statutory purpose came to be used interchangeably, in 
much the same way as Hart and Sacks had. What is important about this 
development is therefore that courts for the first time began expressly 
identifying a deliberate purpose to the enactment of copyright law, beyond 
those internal to the doctrine itself. Purposivism thus emerged as an express 
hallmark of copyright law. Equally crucial to note is that courts remained 
deliberately vague on the precise contents of this policy, which they merely 
referenced on a case-by-case basis.347 Nonetheless, it alluded to the existence 
of an overarching reason behind the existence of copyright, one that some 
courts even traced back to the Constitution.348 This leads us to a second 
observation about the prevalence of this usage, namely that courts used it to 
hint at the existence of a systematic “scheme” behind U.S. copyright law.349 
Not only was the reference to “copyright policy” an allusion to the existence 
of legitimate purposes behind the statute, but it also was meant to suggest a 
systematicity, comprehensiveness, and organization behind these purposes. 
Courts thus began the practice of referring to copyright policy, or “federal 
copyright policy”350 in deciding individual cases, as an added justification for 
 
345 For the earliest usage of the term in federal copyright jurisprudence, see F.W. Woolworth 
Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952). For more recent uses of the term, see Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929 (2005); Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens 
Ltd. P’ship, 737 F.3d 932, 944 (4th Cir. 2013); Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network, 
Inc., 683 F.3d 424, 433 n.1 (2d Cir. 2012); SoundExchange, Inc. v. Librarian of Congress, 571 F.3d 
1220, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
346 See F.W. Woolworth, 344 U.S. at 233-34 (equating the two).  
347 See supra note 345 and cases therein.  
348 See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 839 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(referencing the Constitution and then noting that “[c]opyright	policy	is meant to balance protection, 
which seeks to ensure a fair return to authors and inventors and thereby to establish incentives for 
development, with dissemination, which seeks to foster learning, progress and development”). 
349 See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 551 (1973). 
350 See, e.g., S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989) (“This result is 
contrary to	federal	copyright	policy . . . .”); Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int’l, Inc., 661 F.2d 479, 
483 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[A]pplication of Georgia rules to determine parties’ contractual intent	.	.	.	[does 
not] violate	federal	copyright	policy.” (citations omitted)); Tape Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Younger, 316 
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their interpretation and elaboration of particular rules. Not only was such 
policy presumptively external to the doctrine itself, but as representative of 
broader social concerns, such policy was generally seen as constraining on the 
doctrine in individual cases,351 and most importantly, beyond the purview of 
courts to question. In one oft-quoted decision, Justice Jackson for instance 
relied on “copyright policy” to insist on relying on statutory damages to 
achieve a punitive result and deter infringement.352 Influential commentators 
during this period too began using the phrase, some with a direct link to Hart 
and Sacks.353 In his 1958 Foreword to the Harvard Law Review, Harvard Law 
Professor Ernest Brown, a contemporary of Hart and Sacks and an 
interlocutor of the Legal Process,354 used the term “copyright policy” to refer 
to the balancing of the “incentive to artistic creativity against the resulting 
burden which the copyright imposes upon the public in limiting the available 
supply of artistic works.”355  
Beyond the rhetoric of judicial reasoning and scholarly opinion, the idea 
of a collective social policy undergirding the copyright system reached its 
zenith during the comprehensive legislative revision of the statute, which 
began in 1955. During this process, copyright collectivism was given an 
overtly democratic color through the idea of interest group representation. 
During the drafting of the bill, Congress actively solicited participation from 
“authors, publishers, and other parties with economic interests” in the 
copyright system, and then mediated a negotiated compromise between 
them, which it enacted into law.356 Even when Congress was dubious of the 
substantive wisdom of such a provision, it nonetheless allowed it into law in 
the belief that the representational process—and the compromise that it 
produced—represented the “best solution” as a matter of the process values 
that it embodied.357 Examples of such compromises abound in the text of the 
 
F. Supp. 340, 345 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (examining whether a statutory provision “interferes with 
the	Federal	copyright	policy	devised pursuant to this Constitutional authority by Congress in the 
Copyright Statutes”).  
351 See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 205 n.13 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (noting that the “fair	use doctrine excuses copying that would otherwise be infringement 
in order to vindicate the	copyright	policy	promoting the diffusion of ideas”). 
352 F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 344 U.S. 228, 233-34 (1952). 
353 See Chafee, supra note 216, at 526; Benjamin Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The 
Question of Phonograph Records, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 475 (1955).  
354 See Shaw, supra note 28, at 691 (describing Brown’s role in a reading group organized by Hart). 
355 Ernest J. Brown, Foreword: Process of Law, 72 HARV. L. REV. 77, 147 (1958). 
356 Litman, supra note 2, at 861. 
357 See id. at 862 (“The record demonstrates that members of Congress chose to enact 
compromises whose wisdom they doubted because of their belief that, in this area of law, the solution 
of compromise was the best solution.”). 
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1976 Act.358 Compromise was thus seen as worthy for its own sake, and 
because it functioned as a stand-in for the representativeness of the process. 
One scholar makes the following point: “Such veneration for compromise 
runs through the entirety of the Act’s legislative history. Congress invited, 
nurtured, and occasionally compelled the compromises embodied in the 1976 
Act. Sometimes, it disregarded everyone’s better judgment in favor of giving 
effect to the agreement of interested parties. Congress welcomed compromise 
for compromise’s sake.”359 
Scholars have referred to this process to question the utility of courts’ 
reliance on the legislative history to discern a congressional “intent,” a 
question that need not detain us here.360 All the same, Congress’s overbearing 
emphasis on compromise highlights its recognition that the content of the 
law was to be collectively determined, through the best representation of the 
social interests involved in the regime. Copyright law was not something 
innate or naturalistic that required elucidation based on first principles (such 
as matters of right), but instead a matter of (group) policy, that was guided 
by overtly utilitarian considerations emanating from the constitutional text.  
A natural, and expected, consequence of this turn towards a collectivist 
compromise was a resurgence of utilitarian thinking and rhetoric in copyright 
reasoning. While utilitarianism had long informed copyright analysis in the 
U.S., the postwar turn towards collectivism gave this dormant framework new 
life. Courts, scholars, and lawmakers began to extol copyright’s logic of 
“incentives” and “encouragement” for creativity as the raison d’être of the 
regime.361 But unlike in the past, this rationale began to make its way into 
actual copyright doctrine. The revision process paid closer-than-ever 
attention to “market” effects and the idea of incentives,362 and courts leading 
 
358 Id. at 861-62; see also, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (defining “work made for hire”); 17 U.S.C. 
§ 109(b)(1)(B) (2018) (describing an exemption from the first sale doctrine); 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2018) 
(describing the cable retransmission licensing scheme). 
359 Litman, supra note 2, at 878. 
360 Id. at 879. 
361 By the 1950s and 1960s, referencing the utilitarian logic of authorial incentives as copyright’s 
primary purpose became commonplace. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 
151, 156 (1975); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 
(1954); Jondora Music Publ’g Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 506 F.2d 392, 397 (3d Cir. 1974); 
United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 377 F.2d 872, 881 (2d Cir. 1967). The first serious 
examination in the scholarly literature of the incentives logic emerged from Justice (then Professor) 
Stephen Breyer. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 291 (1970). In his argument, Breyer 
expressly notes how several aspects of the 1976 Act (then Bill) were motivated by the 
utilitarian/incentives logic that he describes in his paper. Id. at 323-50. 
362 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 47-50 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.S.C.A.N. 5659, 5659-
5663 [hereinafter H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476]. 
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up to and following the revision readily followed suit.363 With its insistence 
on the collective good—and social welfare—utilitarianism thus became the 
central dogma of American copyright thinking, providing the collectivist 
orientation of “policy” and the legislative compromise of 1976 with a strong 
normative foundation, a reality that continues unabated to this day.364 
2. The “Limits” of Copyright Adjudication 
In embarking on a comprehensive “general” revision of the copyright 
statute and thereupon choosing to codify parts of copyright jurisprudence 
that were hitherto judge-made, Congress was of course asserting its primacy 
as copyright lawmaker.365 In one sense, this was hardly surprising given that 
the Constitution expressly treats copyright as legislative in origin.366 Yet, as 
the Register of Copyright at the time pointed out, the new regime “mark[ed] 
a shift in direction for the very philosophy of copyright.”367 And this was 
undoubtedly its institutional reorientation. 
The comprehensiveness of the 1976 codification was meant to send an 
affirmative message about the existence of a well-thought-out national 
copyright policy for the country. Even when the Act omitted codifying an area, 
Congress—through the legislative history and in the text of the Act—took great 
pains to make clear that this omission was deliberate or instead represented a 
conscious delegation of lawmaking authority to courts.368 And in so doing, 
Congress managed to entrench a strong intentionalist framework into copyright 
lawmaking.369 Congress’s “intent” was to be treated as paramount within the 
domain; other institutions (including courts) were to glean this intent, 
elaborate on it, or at the very least make every effort to avoid vitiating it. 
Congress was presumed to have either (i) thought about an issue and made its 
 
363 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) 
(adopting a market-based rationale in discussing a fair use defense). 
364 See Balganesh, supra note 44, at 1576-77 (“[C]opyright law in the United States has 
undeniably come to be understood almost entirely in utilitarian, incentive-driven terms.”). 
365 The Amending Act of 1976 was itself titled a general revision. See General Revision of 
Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976); cf. Ringer, supra note 2, at 479 
(characterizing the Act as a “radical	.	.	.	departure”). 
366 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
367 Ringer, supra note 2, at 479. 
368 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 362, at 66-67 (dealing with the fair use doctrine 
and noting that the provision was “intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not 
to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way”); see also id. at 61 (referencing the text’s “[u]se of the 
phrase ‘to authorize’ is intended to avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers,” 
a doctrine that had been judicially created). 
369 For a general overview of this approach, see Cheryl Boudreau et al., Statutory Interpretation 
and the Intentional(ist) Stance, 38 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 2131, 2133-38 (2005); Daniel B. Rodriguez, 
The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 930 (1989) (book review). The origins 
of intentionalism as a distinctive approach are traced back to Hart and Sacks. See id. at 930 n.65. 
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intentions clear in the text;370 (ii) thought about an issue and chosen to remain 
silent in the text but spoken to the issue elsewhere;371 or (iii) only indirectly 
thought about an issue, which was nonetheless to be respected.372 Different 
areas of the statute came to be understood as representing these various 
intentionalist stances, all of which exalted congressional intent.   
It took hardly any time for courts to embrace the intentionalist mindset 
in their development of copyright jurisprudence.373 In reality though, the 
move in this direction had begun even prior to the enactment of the new 
statute. Even the immediate post-1950 copyright jurisprudence is striking in 
its turn towards discerning a legislative intent/purpose underlying the 1909 
Act, something that was visibly absent in copyright jurisprudence during the 
decades before.374 The enactment of the 1976 Act and the elaborate revision 
process that it was premised on (all of which was very well-documented) 
furthered this trend, such that the search for a congressional intent 
underlying different provisions of the statute (and thereby a purpose) became 
de rigueur after and has subsisted ever since.375 
The adoption of this intentionalist framework within copyright certainly 
affirmed the idea of “legislative supremacy.”376 Yet it also undid a seemingly 
symbiotic relationship between courts and Congress that had existed in 
 
370 See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 369, at 930 (observing how even for intentionalists, the text 
remains the first stop). For an example in the copyright context, see 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2018), which 
codifies the principle of divisibility of copyright’s rights. The legislative history indicates that the text 
represents Congress’s intent to change the law. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 362, at 122-124. 
371 An example of this is the role of intent in understanding whether two or more authors are joint 
authors. The text does not emphasize the role of intent as such, see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (defining 
“joint work”), but the legislative history makes clear that the “touchstone here is the intention” of the 
parties. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 362, at 120; see also Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 505-
06 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing the legislative history concerning intent in joint authorship). 
372 A good illustration here is the debate about whether copyright’s distribution right covers 
the “making available” of a work. For an overview of this debate, and an argument that Congress 
indirectly addressed this issue, see Peter S. Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the 
Right to Distribute in the Internet Age, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 6-27, 52-63 (2011). 
373 For the use of legislative history to ascertain intent immediately following the passage of 
the 1976 Act, see Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 
579 F.2d 294, 296-97 (4th Cir. 1978); Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 
243, 248 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).  
374 Hardly any pre-1950 decisions paid serious attention to the legislative history of the 1909 
Act. Yet, post-1950 (prior to the passage of the 1976 Act), we begin to see courts referencing the 
history of the 1909 Act. See, e.g., Miller v. Goody, 139 F. Supp. 176, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Davis v. E. 
I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 249 F. Supp. 329, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. 
United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1351 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff ’d by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). 
This inquiry reached its fullest recognition in the 1954 Supreme Court case of Mazer v. Stein, 347 
U.S. 201, 214 (1954). 
375 For recent instantiations, see ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 441-45 (2014); Kirtsaeng 
v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 533-38 (2013).  
376 See Rodriguez, supra note 369, at 930 n.66 (discussing the idea of “legislative supremacy”). 
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copyright lawmaking until then. Judges and scholars have lamented this turn, 
and argued that it unduly limits courts’ role (and expertise) in developing 
copyright law.377 All the same, understood through the lens of Legal Process 
theory, this framework successfully introduced an important component into 
the copyright landscape: institutional settlement.  
To Legal Process theory, the subordination of the judicial role—in 
lawmaking—was simultaneously both limiting and enabling. On the one hand, 
courts were to comply with Congress’s statutory directives, which limited 
their broad discretion. At the same time, “reasoned elaboration” made courts 
the principal gatekeepers of reason and persuasion in the legal system. And 
this gatekeeping function entailed recognizing that there were indeed 
moments in the operation of the law where reason had to give way to broader 
social considerations.378 Reason was the domain of “principle” and it had to 
be continually balanced against the demands of “policy,” a message that was 
implicit in the limits placed on courts.  
This is precisely what occurred within copyright law, especially following 
the comprehensive revision. With the compromise delicately enshrined into 
the new regime, courts were obligated to tread cautiously. Implicit in this 
mandate was the recognition that in numerous situations (though not all), 
copyright policy took precedence over copyright principles. Even when their 
reasoned application of principle (to the individual facts of a case) pushed 
them in one direction, courts were to remain acutely aware of unsettling the 
regime’s policy embedded into the statute. And when the two conflicted, the 
latter was to unequivocally prevail.379  
Copyright adjudication was therefore not to be the primary vehicle for 
policymaking. Copyright policymaking came to be seen as firmly 
“polycentric” in nature, a term that Fuller had used to describe situations 
where a single decision had implications beyond those limited to the litigating 
parties, necessitated greater consideration of its long term effects, and 
encompassed areas where “courts move too slowly to keep up with [] rapidly 
 
377 See, e.g., Leval, supra note 39, at 1062 (arguing that the “old [symbiotic] model worked pretty well”). 
378 See Dorf, supra note 22, at 981 (observing how “reasoned elaboration” was “subordinated” to 
institutional arrangements). 
379 For an early example, see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). In Mazer, the petitioners 
advanced the argument—drawn from principle—that patentable subject matter should be excluded 
from the gamut of copyrightable works. Id. at 204-05. Their reasoning had to do with the need for 
additional scrutiny before designs obtained protection, something that design patents offered but 
copyright did not. Id. at 215. The Court rejected this principle-based argument, by reference to the 
statutory policy. See id. at 217 (“Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a 
thing is patentable it may not be copyrighted.”). The Court later expressly referenced the overall 
“economic philosophy” behind the statute to justify its holding. Id. at 219. 
1168 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 1101 
changing” circumstances.380 Fuller, on whom Hart and Sacks relied heavily 
for their theory,381 was clear that polycentric problems were “unsuited to 
solution by adjudication,” and had to be solved by tuning elsewhere, 
specifically to legislative (or “deal” based) solutions.382 Fuller’s arguments 
found obvious resonance in copyright law. Whereas copyright adjudication 
had in previous times been seen as itself generative of the system’s core 
principles and ideas, the conception of copyright that emerged from the new 
regime was one of a negotiated bargain, wherein the distributional effects and 
long-term costs of individualized lawmaking necessitated limiting the role of 
courts. The problems of copyright were therefore polycentric. 
Fuller’s argument for the limits of adjudication went further: 
“Adjudication is not a proper form of social ordering in those areas where the 
effectiveness of human association would be destroyed if it were organized 
about formally defined ‘rights’ and ‘wrongs.’”383 Implicit in the new regime’s 
treatment of copyright as polycentric was therefore the recognition that it 
was indeed more than just about rights and wrongs, or in other words, more 
than a private law institution that could be managed through the horizontal 
interaction between parties. The inadequacy of copyright adjudication as a 
method of lawmaking was therefore as much normative—driven by a vision 
of the public law/private law distinction—as it was structural, and driven by 
the existence of a coherent and comprehensive legislative policy for the area. 
3. Administering the Copyright System with Expertise 
While the Copyright Office was established in 1897384 and tasked with 
administering the various formalities associated with the copyright statute, its 
role as an actual lawmaker had remained fairly minimal through 1950. While 
the Office had issued regulations under the 1909 Act dealing with the types of 
works it would register and the conditions for such registration, these 
regulations seldom entered the landscape as an independent source of law. This 
changed dramatically in 1954, with the Court’s decision in Mazer v. Stein.385 
In Mazer, the Court was called upon to determine whether the copyright 
statute allowed protection for artistic articles (a statuette) that were 
embedded into articles that served a useful purpose (a table lamp).386 In 
 
380 Fuller, supra note 17, at 394-95. The essay was written in 1959 but published after Fuller’s 
death. Id. at 353. 
381 See supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
382 Fuller, supra note 17, at 398, 400. 
383 Id. at 370-71. 
384 Act of Feb. 19, 1897, Pub. L. No. 54-265, 29 Stat. 538, 545. 
385 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
386 Id. at 202-05. 
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answering the question in the affirmative, the Court made direct reference to 
the regulations issued by the Office on the question and concluded that “we 
have a contemporaneous and long-continued construction of the statutes by 
the agency charged to administer them that would allow the registration of 
such a statuette as is in question here,” which was probative on the coverage 
of the statute.387 A few things are noteworthy about this observation. 
First, it recognized—for the first time in copyright jurisprudence—that 
the agency (the Office) was “charged” with administering the statute.388 In 
other words, this amounted to an open affirmation that the Office had a 
distinctive role in the copyright landscape beyond just accepting registrations 
and deposits. Second, the Court was nonetheless silent on the quantum of 
weight the Office’s interpretation had to be afforded. While Chevron389 and 
Mead390 had of course not yet been decided, the case of Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co.391 was at the time a whole decade old; and yet, the court chose not to cite 
to it.392 Third, the Court did more than just point to the Office’s 
interpretation. Instead it readily adopted the language of the regulation into 
its holding, noting that it could “hardly do better than the words of the 
present Regulation.”393 This language would then make its way into the 
comprehensive revision, and eventually the 1976 Act as well.394 
Mazer was hardly a one-off event. To the contrary, it signaled the regime’s 
acceptance of the growing role of the Office within the copyright system. A 
few years later, when Congress embarked on the project of comprehensively 
revising the copyright statute, it commenced the task by appropriating funds 
for the Office to carry out a “comprehensive program of research and studies” 
to lay “the groundwork for general revision.”395 The Office then 
commissioned a series of reports, and generated a draft statute which formed 
the basis of subsequent congressional action and eventually produced a 
compromise among the competing interest groups involved in the process.396 
Of the thirty-four reports that were eventually produced, five dealt with the 
 
387 Id. at 213. 
388 Id. 
389 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
390 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
391 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
392 The Court in Mazer instead chose to cite to the case of Great Northern Railway Co. v. United States, 
315 U.S. 262 (1942). Mazer, 347 U.S. at 213 n.26. Great Northern Railway held that a “contemporaneous 
administrative interpretation” of a statute is pertinent to its construction. 315 U.S. at 275. 
393 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 214. 
394 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (defining “[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”). 
395 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 1961 REPORT, supra note 33, at x.  
396 Id. at iii, 149-60.  
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functions and roles of the Office.397 One report in particular, delved into the 
question of the Office’s (i.e., the Register’s) “discretion” under the Act and 
the extent to which courts should defer to decisions and interpretations of the 
Office.398 According weight and discretion to the Office was seen as naturally 
connected to “a limit on the court’s power to overrule the Register.”399 Acutely 
aware of its growing prominence, this report further recommended: 
[T]here is no articulated body of decisions dealing with the extent to which 
the courts should attach weight or a presumption of correctness to the 
Register's determinations. Although ultimately expressed in the issuance or 
denial of an original or renewal certificate, these determinations cover a wide 
range, from decisions on whether a notice is in the right place to decisions on 
copyrightability of large classes of works. If it should be thought advisable to 
define the courts’ proper attitude toward Register's determinations, 
distinctions might be taken in terms of the kinds of decisions involved.400 
While largely unexceptional from today’s perspective, these observations 
were fairly bold at the time, given the existing lawmaking dynamic that 
subsisted in copyright. Not only had the Office begun to see itself as playing 
a central role in the formulation of the new regime, but it recognized some 
value in having the system limit courts’ ability to second-guess its 
determinations and rulemaking in various domains. 
While Hart and Sacks did not pay as much attention in their account to 
administrative agencies as they did to other institutions,401 they nonetheless 
saw the exercise of delegated administrative rulemaking as making important 
inroads into the role of courts. When such a delegation of lawmaking power 
was made, the agency assumed “first-line official responsibility” for the 
area.402 They further argued that when this occurred, “courts will usually 
recognize the practical significance of the agency’s primary responsibility and 
will hesitate	.	.	.	to overturn any well-considered determination which the 
agency has made . . . .”403 In developing their account of administrative 
 
397 See CARUTHERS BERGER, STUDY NO. 18: AUTHORITY OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS TO REJECT APPLICATIONS FOR REGISTRATION  81 (1959); ELIZABETH K. DUNNE, 
STUDY NO. 20: DEPOSIT OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS ix (1960); ELIZABETH K. DUNNE & JOSEPH 
W. ROGERS, STUDY NO. 21: THE CATALOG OF COPYRIGHT ENTRIES 51 (1960); BENJAMIN 
KAPLAN, STUDY NO. 17: THE REGISTRATION OF COPYRIGHT ix (1958); ; ALAN LATMAN, STUDY 
NO. 19: THE RECORDATION OF COPYRIGHT ASSIGNMENTS AND LICENSES 107 (1958). 
398 KAPLAN, supra note 397, at 27-28. 
399 Id. at 28. 
400 Id. 
401 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 165-66. Hart individually appears to have spent significant 
time considering the role of agencies separately. Eskridge & Frickey, Making, supra note 17, at 2038. 
402 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 165. 
403 Id. at 166. 
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agencies, Hart and Sacks were to a large extent echoing the more elaborate 
views of a prior Legal Process theorist—James Landis. Much like his 
colleague and mentor Frankfurter, Landis saw administrative agencies as the 
solution to a variety of regulatory issues in the post-New Deal economy.404 
Institutionally, agencies were endowed with the ability to specialize in a 
singular domain and develop an expertise that allowed them to avoid 
becoming “jacks-of-all-trades and masters of none,” a problem that he saw as 
plaguing courts and Congress.405 Expertise thus emerged as the primary 
justification for agencies, which Hart and Sacks embellished with an 
institutional account in their theory. 
Leading up to the general revision, the Office had come to establish itself as 
the institutional repository of copyright expertise. Further advantaging it in this 
regard was the reality that as a branch of Congress—unlike traditional executive 
agencies—the Office could legitimately play a role in the revision process that 
affirmed the ideal of legislative supremacy. And this it realized with few 
noticeable downsides. Seemingly in return, Congress came to expressly delegate 
actual lawmaking authority to the Office under the terms of the statute.406 Since 
1976, this has expanded dramatically, with the effect that the Office is today 
quite legitimately an independent institutional source of copyright law.407 
While the Office has come to be widely recognized as the agency with 
primary expertise on copyright, its unique status—as a branch of the 
legislature—continues to impede its recognition as a full-blown executive 
agency that is to be shown the level of deference ordinarily accorded to other 
federal agencies interpreting their parent statutes.408 While courts continue 
to disagree over its status as a pure executive (as opposed to legislative) 
agency, they nonetheless continue to afford its interpretations Skidmore 
deference, dependent on their persuasiveness in the situation.409 This 
 
404 JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 30-37 (1938). For an overview of the 
intellectual cross-currents between Landis and Frankfurter, see THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS 
OF REGULATION 155-57 (1984); JUSTIN O’BRIEN, THE TRIUMPH, TRAGEDY AND LOST LEGACY 
OF JAMES M LANDIS: A LIFE ON FIRE 50 (2014). 
405 LANDIS, supra note 404, at 31. 
406 See 17 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2018) (“All administrative functions and duties under this title, except 
as otherwise specified, are the responsibility of the Register of Copyrights	.	.	.	.”). 
407 For a general overview of the Office’s role in the current copyright system and its efforts to 
improve that system, see Pallante, supra note 40. 
408 See United States v. Brooks, 945 F. Supp. 830, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (adopting the view that the 
Office is a legislative institution). But see Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 
F.3d 1332, 1341-42 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (taking the position that the Office is an executive branch agency).  
409 See, e.g., Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 755 F.3d 1038, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding 
Office’s reasoning set forth “[i]n an opinion letter and an internal manual” to be persuasive); Alaska 
Stock, LLC v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publ’g Co., 747 F. 3d 673, 684-86 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding 
the Office’s longstanding registration policy persuasive and worthy of deference). The Office 
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phenomenon is precisely what both Legal Process theory and the Court in 
Mazer contemporaneously advanced, to effectively introduce a new source of 
institutional lawmaking into the domain. 
In entrenching the idea of the Copyright Office as the expert body on 
copyright law, and investing it with lawmaking and policymaking authority, 
the post-1950 copyright regime effectively came full circle in adopting and 
venerating the structural and functional lessons of Legal Process theory and 
its emphasis on institutional settlement as the central idea of law. Copyright 
law was thus no longer just about either judicially crafted principles, or indeed 
legislatively delineated directives, but instead also about the Office’s 
interpretation and application of those sources (i.e., case law and statutory 
directives) in individual cases. Copyright law had thus fully entered the 
consciousness of the modern administrative state. 
* * * 
Copyright Register Barbara Ringer was undoubtedly correct when she 
emphasized that the regime coming out of the comprehensive copyright 
revision of 1955–74 had adopted an altogether new “philosophy.”410 And this 
was its move in the direction of a public law model, wherein institutional, 
administrative, and policy-based considerations would dominate. Indeed, 
what it produced was an altogether different conception of copyright law. 
Therein the content of the law was directly connected to the question of 
institutional authority, and the overt instrumentalism that such authority 
came to represent—under the influence of Legal Process theory.  
The figure below graphically illustrates much of this move away from the 
private law conception, which focused on the rights and duties of the litigants 
around core principles, to the Realist conception of copyright that had courts 
adopt an ex ante but nonetheless juricentric approach to copyright 
lawmaking, to finally the Legal Process-influenced public law approach 
wherein the regulation of creativity and creative markets through 
institutional coordination came to dominate, and produce the regime 







acknowledges that Skidmore deference is the appropriate level of deference to be accorded to its 
interpretations. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at 2. 
410 Ringer, supra note 2, at 479. 
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Figure 1: The Move from Private Law to Public Law in Copyright 
 
 










IV. DEALING WITH A HYBRID COPYRIGHT SYSTEM 
The U.S. copyright regime that emerged from the 1976 revision—and 
which remains in existence today—was therefore fundamentally different 
from anything that had preceded it. Fully ensconced in the realities of the 
administrative state and driven by a turn towards collectivist thinking, it had 
quite successfully internalized the core lessons of Legal Process thinking. 
Despite the pervasive influence of Legal Process thinking on its functioning, 
modern copyright thinking and jurisprudence have done surprisingly little to 
acknowledge this reality and to embrace the fact that it is today a truly hybrid 
legal regime revealing a confluence of private law and public ideas and 
concepts in its everyday operation. Accepting the reality of this postwar 
transformation in the American copyright regime, this Part offers a few 
(albeit brief) suggestions on what it would mean for the regime to accept and 
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Perhaps the most important lesson to take away from the Legal Process 
turn in modern copyright law is its influence on what “copyright law” today 
denotes in the American legal system. While copyright law is ordinarily taken 
to denote the formal substantive rules of the regime (both statutory and 
decisional), the influence of Legal Process suggests that this conception is 
myopic. Copyright law is instead better understood as a “process,”411 and it 
encompasses the entirety of the institutional, structural, and directive 
arrangements that are collectively directed towards achieving a set of plural 
goals—revolving around the management of creative expression. Understood 
in this vein, American copyright law is neither exclusively about the private 
rights and immunities of creators and copiers, nor indeed entirely about the 
public regulation of creative markets. It is instead a combination of 
mechanisms and ideas that interact with each other as a system in the pursuit 
of coordinating the production and use of creative expression. This holistic, 
systems-based approach to the regime produces three further prescriptive 
insights for modern copyright thinking. 
A. Protocols for Institutional Settlement in Copyright 
With the formal content of copyright law today emanating from multiple 
institutional actors—Congress, federal courts, and the Copyright Office—the 
regime would benefit from a set of norms and principles allocating different 
aspects of copyright lawmaking to different actors. While each institution 
individually plays an active role in the lawmaking process, the questions of 
allocation and appropriate settlements become all-important whenever a 
potential overlap presents itself. 
Looking to the Supreme Court’s copyright jurisprudence over the last two 
decades reveals some useful patterns of institutional settlement in the 
copyright regime. While these patterns have never been expressly articulated 
by the Court in its decisionmaking, their development and explication would 
prove to be of enormous guidance and value to lower courts (district courts 
and courts of appeal) where the problems of such settlement present 
themselves on a fairly regular basis. 
Indeed, examining the Court’s jurisprudence reveals the following general 
patterns of institutional settlement. First, when it comes to questions 
involving the structure of the copyright entitlement as expressly and 
unambiguously delineated by Congress in the statute, Congress’s views are to 
be treated as peremptory. Courts are not to “second-guess” congressional 
“policy judgments” even if seen as overtly “unwise,” unless it alters the 
 
411 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at cxxxvii, 148. 
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“traditional contours” of copyright.412 Second, on questions relating to the 
copyright entitlement where Congress has not expressly spoken or acted, 
courts may develop and elaborate Congress’s policy preferences while 
ensuring that such preferences are not overridden or negated.413 Third, where 
Congress has not indicated a preference at all, or has instead revealed an 
incomplete preference, courts can treat the question as an implicit delegation 
of power to them to settle the question through situational adjudication.414 
Fourth, where the question relates directly to copyright adjudication and the 
settlement of individual disputes, courts are at liberty to develop the law 
through the use of general principles.415  
We might usefully call each of these settlement approaches: peremptory 
settlement, compatibility settlement, adjudicative settlement, and principled 
settlement, respectively; and each is well-represented in the Court’s 
copyright jurisprudence. The problem is of course that the Court itself hardly 
articulates these norms, with the result that they remain hidden underneath 
the substantive content of the law, often eluding lower courts. Embracing the 
Legal Process turn in copyright thinking would likely enable a clearer 
articulation of these protocols, all of which derive from the theory’s core idea 













412 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208, 221 (2003). 
413 See, e.g., ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 451 (2014) (interpreting the public 
performance right to apply to online retransmissions); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 
U.S. 519, 525 (2013) (interpreting the first sale limitation on the distribution right to apply 
internationally). 
414 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005) 
(developing the principle of liability for inducement of infringement); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (developing the transformative use variant of fair use). 
415 See, e.g., Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 684 (2014) (finding the 
doctrine of laches inapplicable to the copyright statute); Feltner v. Columbia Picures Television, 
Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998) (looking to historic practice to conclude that the award of statutory 
damages was a question for the jury); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994) (developing 
an equal treatment principle in the award of attorney’s fees). 
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Table 1: Institutional Settlement Protocols in Copyright 
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B. Reasoned Elaboration as the Elaboration of Copyright Principles 
While the idea of institutional settlement certainly reveals a preference 
for copyright lawmaking to emerge primarily from majoritarian institutions, 
i.e., Congress, this hardly implies a passive role for courts. Indeed, this is a 
reality that is often forgotten about Legal Process theory. In requiring courts 
to avoid second-guessing Congress on certain questions, the theory 
nonetheless encourages them to assume primary responsibility on others.416 
The theory therefore implicitly carves out a domain of legitimacy for courts 
within the copyright space. This domain of legitimacy derives from courts’ 
presumptive monopoly over “reasoned argument.”417 
 
416 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 146-47. 
417 Fuller, supra note 17, at 366. 
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The hallmark of courts therefore lies in their reliance on “reason” as a 
mechanism of social ordering, and the primary conduit of such reasoned 
argumentation was seen to be the use of “principles”—arguments internal to 
the doctrinal domain at issue, and which are asserted as claims of justice or 
morality demanded by that domain.418 Courts therefore rely on principles in 
their elaboration, whereas Congress relies on considerations of policy, which 
are external to the regime itself. 
Whereas copyright reasoning in the post-1950 regime has paid acutely 
close attention to issues of policy and to ensuring the existence of a coherent 
copyright policy, courts have yet to fully embrace their role as the regime’s 
guardians of principle. In elaborating on congressionally determined policy, 
under the protocols of settlement described previously, courts should remain 
steadfast in identifying and developing a set of “copyright principles,” a 
domain that is their exclusive prerogative. To the contrary, modern courts 
seem content to identify and examine the scope of Congress’s copyright 
policy to decide individual cases, taking the question of settlement (and 
deference) entirely at face value.419 
A large part of why copyright law has remained a coherent subject through 
the ages is because several of its bedrock principles have remained constant 
and meaningful over the years, despite the regime’s transition in policy 
priorities. Indeed, even the Supreme Court appears to have endorsed this 
idea, when it noted that Congress was not at liberty to alter the “traditional 
contours” of copyright law, a phrase that references what have long been 
thought of as copyright principles such as the idea-expression dichotomy or 
copyright’s unwillingness to protect facts.420  
Copyright law would thus benefit from a more direct judicial engagement 
with its basic principles. Courts ought to see themselves as the guardians of 
reason within the copyright system, work towards identifying the internal 
rationality of copyright doctrine using various principles,421 and then attempt 
to synthesize congressional policy with these principles. The balance between 
principle and policy was an integral component of the Legal Process theory, 
which allowed the law to retain an internal intelligibility and determinacy 
 
418 Id. at 372.  
419 See, e.g., ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 447 (2014) (relying purely on the statute to 
find liability); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 523-25 (2013) (focusing on 
statutory policy to develop the first sale doctrine rather than offering principles); Kienitz v. Sconnie 
Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758-59 (7th Cir. 2014) (abandoning the judicially-formulated 
transformativeness principle and focusing on interpreting the statute using statutory policy).  
420 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). For more on the traditional contours of 
copyright, see generally Robert Kasunic, Preserving the Traditional Contours of Copyright, 30 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 397 (2007). 
421 These principles could include the idea/expression dichotomy, the exclusion of facts, 
originality, fixation, authorship, merger, substantial similarity, and the like. 
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that rendered it more than purely political. If copyright law is to subsist as a 
coherent idea in the new regime, it will inevitably fall to courts to assume 
their role as the gatekeepers (and protectors) of reason within the functioning 
of the regime and effect a balance between policy and principle. Courts ought 
to give the idea of “traditional contours” more consideration in their 
adjudication422 and use it to elaborate on different aspects of the copyright 
statute, adopting what has been described as a “dynamic” approach to 
statutory interpretation.423 
C. Developing an Administrative Copyright Law 
While the Legal Process turn in the copyright regime has forced it to 
confront the realities of the modern American administrative state, including 
the ideals of divided lawmaking and interbranch coordination, the substantive 
law governing this interface has lagged behind. The role of the Copyright 
Office within the copyright system has only grown over the course of the 
latter half of the twentieth century.424 The truest affirmation of its status as a 
full-fledged rulemaking body emerged in 1998, when it was granted the power 
to create exceptions to the copyright statute’s anticircumvention provisions 
for “particular class[es] of copyrighted works” through a rulemaking 
proceeding.425 During such rulemaking, the Office is allowed to consider a 
variety of different factors on a discretionary basis.426 Quite independent of 
this, the Office is also given the unilateral authority to appoint Copyright 
Royalty Judges to adjudicate various royalty disputes under the statute.427 
Despite this growth in the role and responsibilities of the Office, 
copyright jurisprudence itself has spent surprisingly little time addressing the 
substantive integration of the Office into the skein of copyright law. To the 
contrary, courts routinely attempt to avoid such questions even when 
confronted with them.428 Complicating the matter is the growing diversity of 
 
422 Very few courts have given the concept due consideration since the Supreme Court’s use of 
the phrase in Eldred. But see, e.g., Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 893 (9th Cir. 
2005) (en banc) (noting how the balance between authors and society is realized in “the traditional 
contours of copyright protection” (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221)). 
423 See Eskridge, supra note 296, at 1484 (describing the “evolutive perspective” as a core part 
of this approach). 
424 See Pallante, supra note 40, at 213-14 (discussing the Office’s public education programs and 
revisions of Office standards and practices). 
425 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2018). 
426 Id. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(v). 
427 Id. § 801(a)–(b). 
428 See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Aereokiller, LLC, 851 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(“To resolve this issue, we would be required to rule on constitutional questions that could have 
outsized consequences relative to this case—such as determining whether the Library of Congress 
is a legislative or executive agency.”). 
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functions and determinations that the Office itself makes—which range from 
the mere registration of works and digesting substantive law as part of its 
operations manual, to coordinating with other branches and agencies and 
making actual rules in specific areas. If copyright law is to fully embrace the 
Legal Process turn and accept its role as a hybrid public–private law, it is 
about time for it to develop a body of administrative law dealing with its 
working, a body of “administrative copyright law,” so to speak. 
First and foremost among these questions is the level of deference that 
the Office should be accorded by the other branches.429 The Office’s various 
decisions and rulings are worthy of being disaggregated and treated 
differently. Some merit greater judicial (and legislative) scrutiny and 
conversely less deference, and vice-versa. The Office’s decisions on individual 
registrations for instance, are vastly different from its efforts to synthesize 
case law into abstract principles without applying them to individual cases.430 
Second are issues of interagency coordination.431 Since the Office is 
commonly seen as a branch of the legislature, in recent years the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) has begun to assume a role in the 
development of copyright law and policy.432 As a formal branch of the 
executive, the USPTO is seen as performing the role of a true executive 
agency, which has created obvious operational friction and produced a shared 
administrative space that would benefit from overt mechanisms of 
coordination. A third set of administrative law issues relates to the Office’s 
role in copyright adjudication, through the appointment of royalty judges and 
the creation of claims tribunals. While agencies routinely create 
“administrative law judges” (ALJs), the Office’s unique status again requires 
examining the extent to which the constraints (and enablement) of the 
traditional framework carry over into this domain,433 especially given the 
reality that copyright law—unlike other forms of intellectual property—
depends extensively on adjudication for its functioning.434 
 
429 For past consideration of this question, see Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 755 F.3d 
1038, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2014); Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 286 (3d Cir. 2004); 
Norris Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1983). 
430 See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 478 (6th Cir. 2015) (discussing 
the levels of deference to be accorded to different Office interpretations). 
431 For an overview of how and why agencies share regulatory responsibilities, see generally Jody 
Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012). 
432 See generally, e.g., DEP’T. OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT 
POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2013) (offering suggestions 
for copyright reform as part of the USPTO). 
433 For an overview of the role of ALJs in the administrative system, see generally Jeffrey S. Lubbers, 
Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 109 (1981). 
434 Given the absence of registration as a prerequisite for protection, courts undertake the first 
real scrutiny of the existence and scope of protection. 
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If the Legal Process turn in the copyright system is to become meaningful, 
it will require confronting some of the complex issues dealing with the 
functioning of the administrative state—as they apply to copyright. This is 
hardly just an unintended byproduct of the Legal Process turn; instead it 
should be legitimately seen as the culmination of the theory’s core premises, 
as it has in other domains. 
CONCLUSION 
Modern American copyright law is an evolved system—nuanced, 
textured, and complex. Once understood as primarily a private law 
institution, focused on the horizontal interaction between authors and 
copiers, it is today treated as a form of public regulation wherein collectivist 
ideals and utilitarian goals dominate individual interests. This intellectual 
transformation was hardly just a coincidence. It was instead the result of 
changes in the very conceptions of law, legal reasoning, and legal institutions 
seen in American legal thinking over the course of the last century, which 
came to influence copyright law in significant ways. 
The modern American copyright system reflects the triumph of a very 
influential approach to legal thinking that emerged in the United States 
following World War II: Legal Process theory. Predicated on legislative primacy 
and democratic governance, and committed to the centrality of institutional 
arrangements and divided lawmaking, Legal Process thinking came to inflect 
copyright law with an analytical vision that has dominated the discourse ever 
since. And this inflection, in turn, systematically converted copyright law into a 
framework of public law, a metamorphosis that has gone largely unnoticed. As 
this Article has argued, understanding—and embracing—this transformation 
yields important functional insights about the working of the modern copyright 
system, as well as lessons for future reform efforts in the area. 
The intellectual trajectory of American copyright law over the last century 
further suggests that it is only likely to mutate even further in the future, 
especially as legal thinking and reasoning themselves continue to evolve and 
keep up with changes in socioeconomic and political conditions. The key to 
fully appreciating copyright therefore lies in recognizing that its underlying 
legal normativity is incapable of being understood in isolation, or as 
disconnected from the rest of the political and legal system. It may therefore 
be premature to speak of the “next great Copyright Act” or the “next great 
Copyright Office” in isolation, both of which are phrases that derive from the 
current Legal Process framing of American copyright law—which may well 
no longer be the regime’s dominant intellectual paradigm decades from now. 
Should that occur, copyright law will be a very different creature from what it 
is right now. Fortunately or not, only time will tell. 
